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I. Introduction
Disability insurance benefits protect against the loss of earning power
when an accident or illness renders an individual unable to work.' Individu-
als commonly receive employer-provided disability insurance benefits through
their employee benefit packages.2 In terms of ensuring financial security,
long-term disability benefits arguably constitute the most significant compo-
nent of an employee's benefit package.' Increasingly, however, those employ-
1. See EMPLOYEE BENEFrr RESEARCH INSTITUrE, FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT PROGRAMS 289 (5th ed. 1997) (explaining that disability insurance plans replace
individual's income when illness or injury prevents him from working); JERRY S. ROSENBLOOM
& G. VICTORHAILMAN, EMPLOYEE BENEFRT PLANNING 225 (1981) (defining disability benefits
as cash payments that employers make in lieu of salary while individual is unable to work).
2. See EMPLOYEE BENEF1T RESEARCHINSTrrUTE, supra note 1, at289-90 (reporting that
41% of full-time employees in medium and large private establishments had employer-provided,
long-term disability insurance in 1993); id. at 297 (reporting that 11.8 million full-time
employees at medium and large private enterprises were eligible for long-term disability bene-
fits); id. at 289 (stating that employer-provided disability plans "have gained wide acceptance").
3. See id. at 297 (concluding that disability insurance can mitigate "devastating" eco-
nomic effect of disability on family); ROSENBLOOM & HALLMAN, supra note 1, at 241 ("In terms
of potential loss exposure of financial ruin for employees and their families, long-term disability
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ers who offer long-term disability plans are placing caps on the provision of
mental disability benefits.4 Most commonly, these plans cap mental disability
benefits at twenty-four months unless the mental disability requires hospital-
ization.' Meanwhile, these plans pay benefits to individuals with physical
disabilities, regardless of hospitalization, from the onset of the disability until
age sixty-five, the age at which individuals typically become eligible for social
security benefits.6
Individuals with mental disabilities who receive long-term disability
benefits through employer-provided plans that cap mental disability benefits
have sued their former employers under the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (ADA).7 These plaintiffs have alleged that capping mental disability
benefits without similarly capping physical disability benefits violates Title
I of the ADA because the practice discriminates against individuals with
mental disabilities.8 To succeed, these fully mentally disabled former employ-
ees must demonstrate both that they are proper plaintiffs and that the ADA
mandates parity in mental and physical disability benefits.9 Specifically,
courts have required fully mentally disabled former employees to show the
following: (1) that individuals who no longer are able to perform the essential
protection is perhaps one of the most important in the entire employee benefit plan."); Mary T.
Giliberti, The Application of the ADA to Distinctions Based on Mental Disability in Employee-
Provided Health andLong-Term Disability Insurance Plans, 18 MENTAL&PHYSICALDISABIL-
ITYL. REP. 600, 603 (1994) (explaining "disastrous effect" that termination of disability benefits
has on recipients who "find themselves without any income").
4. See Allison C. Blakley, Is Depression DisablingAmerica's Group Insurance Plans?
Mental Health Benefit Parity and the ADA, THE BRIE, Summer 1998, at 40,41 (identifying
mental disability limitation clauses as "most common cost control measure" in disability benefit
plans); Jane Ann SchlitzDisabiliyInsurance Planning, in USES OF INSURANCE INESTATE AND
TAX PLANNING 591,601 (1998) (describing limitations on mental disability coverage as growing
trend in typical disability income insurance plans).
S. See Schlitz, supra note 4, at 601 (explaining that "[m]ost common limit is 24 months
for the life of the contract unless the insured is continuously hospitalized for the disorder").
6. See Giliberti, supra note 3, at 603 (stating that long-term disability plans continue
paying physical disability benefits until age sixty-five - normal retirement age - unless disabil-
ity ceases, while at same time limiting mental disability benefits to two or three year period).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994); see infra note 8 (citing cases in which such individuals
have sued their employers).
8. See, e.g., Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 605 (3d Cir. 1998) (describ-
ing fully disabled individual's claim as alleging that disparity in post-employment benefits
constitutes violation of ADA by former employer), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 850 (1999); Parker
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1008 (6th Cir. 1997) (en bane) (same); EEOC v.
CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 7 F.
Supp. 2d 743,745 (E.D. Va. 1998) (same), vacated and remanded sub nom. Lewis v. W/art
Corp., 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999).
9. See infra notes 10 and 11 and accompanying text (setting out two-pronged showing
that courts require of fully disabled plaintiffs attempting to challenge disparity in employers'
provision of disability benefits).
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functions of their employment positions are proper plaintiffs under Title 110
and (2) that a disparity between mental and physical disability benefits consti-
tutes discrimination cognizable under Title I of the ADA."
Whether a fully disabled former employee is a proper plaintiff under
Title I is the threshold issue. 2 Two federal courts of appeals have dismissed
fully disabled former employees' lawsuits,"3 while two other federal courts of
appeals and one federal district court have interpreted the ADA as permitting
fully disabled former employees to challenge their disability benefit plans. 4
Of the four federal courts of appeals to address the second issue, parity
between mental and physical disability benefits, all have concluded that Title
I permits employers to distinguish between mental and physical conditions in
the provision of disability benefit plans. 5
10. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 604-05 (outlining preliminary question of whether fully
disabled individual may bring ADA claim against former employer when plaintiff is unable to
perform essential functions of position); Nicole L. Martinson, Inequaliy Between Disabilities:
The Different Treatment ofMental Versus Physical Disabilities in Long.Term Disability Plans,
50 BAYLOR L. REv. 361,363 (1998) ("One of the first obstacles presented to a plaintiff under
Title I is the question of whether the plaintiff is entitled to the protection of Title I of the ADA
(i.e. standing).").
11. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 608 (identifying second issue as whether ADA challenge to
disparity between mental and physical disability benefits survives Rule 12(b)(6) motion).
12. See supra note 10 (identifying initial issue as whether fully disabled former employee
is eligible to bring Title I claim); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Insurance and the ADA, 46 DEPAUL
L. REV. 915, 920-21 (1997) (describing question of whether former employees even may bring
Title I claims as "issue of dispute"); Wendy Wilkinson, Judicially Crafted Barriers to Bringing
Suit Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 907, 908 (1997) ("Many
cases are being dismissed at the pre-trial stage because the plaintiff has been unable to prove
to the satisfaction of the courts that they have a disability as defined by the [ADA]."). Because
resolving the issue of eligibility is critical to reaching the ultimate issue of parity, this Note
focuses primarily on the issue of whether an individual who suffers from a fully disabling
mental condition is an eligible plaintiff under Title L
13. See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1008-09 (approving panel's finding that plaintiff was
ineligible to bring suit under Title I of ADA because she could not perform essential duties of
her occupation); CNA Ins., 96 F.3d at 1044-45 (rejecting plaintiff's arguments that disability
recipient qualifies as having employment position and that former employees may invoke
protections of ADA as former employees invoke protections in Title VII suits).
14. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 607 (3d Cir. 1998) (allowing fully
disabled plaintiff to file Title I claim in order to challenge discriminatory post-employment
benefits), cert denied, 119 S. Ct 850 (1999); Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58,68
(2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting interpretation that would bar former employee suits because such
interpretation would frustrate clear purpose of § 12112(a) and (b) of ADA in preventing
discrimination in fringe benefits); Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1163 (E.D.
Va. 1997) (declining to bar former employees who are no longer able to perform jobs because
doing so would "effectively prevent any plaintiff from challenging an employer's provision of
disability benefits as discriminatory under Title I of the ADA"), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Lewis v. KMart Corp., 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999).
15. See Lewis v. KMart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 172 (4th Cir. 1999) (upholding employer's
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This Note examines the cases in which individuals who suffer from a full
mental disability have challenged, under Title I of the ADA, their former
employers' provision of disability insurance that limits long-term mental
disability benefits but does not similarly limit long-term physical disability
benefits. 6 Part R of this Note provides an overview of the history, purpose,
and provisions of Title I of the ADA. 7 In Part III, this Note examines the
disagreement among the federal courts that have addressed whether fully
disabled former employees are eligible to file ADA claims and concludes that
courts should permit these plaintiffs to file Title I claims for the limited
purpose of challenging post-employment benefits.'" Part IV analyzes the
substantive claim that disparity in long-term mental and physical disability
benefits violates the ADA and ultimately reasons that the ADA does require
parity in disability benefit plans, despite the current state ofthe law. 9 Finally,
Part V concludes that courts must allow fully disabled former employees to
sue their employers and must require long-term disability benefit plans to
cover mental disabilities and physical disabilities equally.2"
disability plan that provided less generous mental disability benefits based on conclusion that
ADA only outlaws discrimination against class of individuals with disability, not discrimination
among the individuals within the class); Ford, 145 F.3d at 608 (stating that disparity in mental
and physical disability benefits does not constitute violation of Title I of ADA); Parker v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1015 (6th Cir. 1997) (en bane) (stating that ADA
does not require disability plans to treat mental and physical disabilities equally); EEOC v.
CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1996) (refusing to read parity requirement into
Title I of ADA).
16. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 604 (describing defendant's disability insurance plan as limiting
mental disability benefits to two-year period while paying former employees physical disability
benefits from time of disability until age sixty-five); Parker, 121 F.3d at 1008 (summarizing
defendant's disability insurance plan as limiting mental disability benefits to two years, absent
hospitalization, while paying physical disability benefits until age sixty-five); CNA Ins., 96 F.3d
1041 (describing defendant's disability insurance plan as limiting mental disability benefits to
two-year period while paying physical disability benefits from time of disability until age sixty-
five); Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 7 F. Supp. 2d 743, 745 (E.D. Va. 1998) (same); Schroeder
v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., No. 93-M-2433, 1994 WL 909636, at *1 (D. Colo. Apr. 22,
1994) (summarizing defendant's disability insurance plan as limiting mental disability benefits
to thirty months without imposing same limitation upon physical disability benefits).
17. See infra Part II (summarizing legislative history, congressional intent, and statutory
language of ADA).
18. See infra Part III (describing competing conclusions among federal courts and
concluding that those allowing fully disabled individuals' suits are correct).
19. See infra Part IV (reviewing arguments of cases on each side of parity issue and
concluding that ADA does require parity in disability benefit plans).
20. See infra Part V (linking two issues and arguing that Title I permits fully disabled
employees to sue their employers and requires employer-provided long-term disability benefit
plans to provide equal coverage for mental and physical disabilities).
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ff. Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act
A. History and Purpose of Title I
1. The Foundation: The Rehabilitation Act of.1973
Prior to the ADA's enactment, individuals with disabilities chiefly relied
on the Rehabilitation Act of 197321 to fight disability-based discrimination.22
The Rehabilitation Act, however, proved insufficient to provide comprehen-
sive protection against disability-based discrimination.' Although the statute
outlawed discrimination against individuals with mental disabilities,24 courts
and agencies rarely awarded relief to individuals with mental disabilities
under the Rehabilitation Act.' This reluctance stemmed, in part, from the
lack of public understanding of and support for individuals with mental disa-
bilities.2 6 For individuals with mental disabilities, therefore, the Rehabilita-
21. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
22. See Michel Lee, SearchingforPatterns andAnomalies in theADA Employment Con-
stellation: Who Is a Qualified Individual with a Disability and What Accommodations Are
Courts Really Demanding?, 13 LAB. LAW. 149, 149 n.2 (1997) (stating that before Congress
enacted ADA, Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act constituted only other significant federal law
prohibiting disability-based employment discrimination). In passing the Rehabilitation Act,
Congress sought to better the lives of individuals with disabilities through vocational training,
research, and increased federal employment of individuals with disabilities. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 701(b) (1999) (describing purposes of Rehabilitation Act as to "empower individuals with
disabilities" through vocational rehabilitation programs, research and training, and to assure that
the Federal Government will "play a leadership role in promoting the employment" of such
individuals).
23. SeeH.REP.No. 101-485,pt. 2 at48 (1990),reprinted in THELEGISLATIVEHISTORY
OF THE AMERICANS WrTH DISABMIT]Es ACT, at 311 (G. John Tysee ed., 1990) [hereinafter
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (summarizing statement of Attorney General Richard Thornburgh
regarding federal disability discrimination law prior to ADA as "a patchwork quilt in need of
repair. There are holes in the fabric, serious gaps in coverage that leave persons with disabilities
without adequate civil rights protections"); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABulTY, EQUALITY OF
OPPORTUNiTY: THEMAKINGOFT-EAMERICANSWITHDISABITSACT 182 (1997) (summariz-
ing characterization of pre-ADA law as "[s]wiss cheese covering a map of the United States:
there were many holes where there were little to no civil rights protections for persons with
disabilities").
24. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(A) (1994) (stating that Rehabilitation Act counts either
"physical or mental impairment" as covered disability).
25. See Leonard S. Rubenstein, Mental Disorder and the ADA, in IMPLEMENTING THE
AMERICANS wITH DISABIL1TES ACT 209, 211 (Lawrence 0. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds.,
1993) (providing examples of ways in which courts have refused to extend protections of
Section 504 to individuals with mental disabilities).
26. See id. at 220 (attributing Rehabilitation Act's failure to assist individuals with mental
disabilities to fact that in 1973, Rehabilitation Act's applicability to individuals with mental
disabilities represented forward thinking). Rubenstein asserts that "[n]either society nor the
judiciary was prepared to accept its implications." Id.
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tion Act offered little real assistance in combating discrimination and prejudi-
cial stereotypes.
27
The employment provision of the Rehabilitation Act, Title V, addressed
only discrimination by federal agencies and entities contracting or otherwise
associating with federal agencies.' In Section 504 of Title V, Congress made
a strong statement against disability-based discrimination in the employment
context; however, the section lacked clear guidance on how to enforce its
provisions.29 These deficiencies prevented the Rehabilitation Act from
effectively redressing disability-based discrimination and motivated Congress
to enact stronger legislation, the ADA.
30
2. The Aspiration: The Purpose of Title I
In designing Title I ofthe ADA, Congress used Title V ofthe Rehabilita-
tion Act as the foundation of the ADA's substantive protections,31 but explic-
27. See id. at 212 (describing Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act as "dead letter for people
with mental disabilities"); Stephanie Proctor Miller, Keeping the Promise: The ADA and
Employment Discrimination on the Basis ofPsychiatric Disability, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 701,701
(1997) (stating that "many Rehabilitation Act precedents are infused with ... stereotypes and
prejudices against individuals with psychiatric disabilities").
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994) (forbidding federal entities or recipients of federal
assistance from participating in disability-based discrimination). Section 794(a) reads:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability. . . shall, solely by reason of her
or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive
agency or by the United States Postal Service.
Id.; see H. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 47-48,reprintedin LEGsLAnvmE HISTORY, supra note 23,
at 311 (describing coverage of pre-ADA federal disability discrimination law). House Report
101-485 summarized the scope of pre-ADA law as extending only to "discrimination by Federal
agencies, entities that have contracts with the Federal government, and recipients of Federal
financial assistance." Id.
29. See STEPHEN L. PERCY, DISABInIY, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 63 (1989)
(concluding that Rehabilitation Act's "measures were stronger on symbolic statement than
guidelines for implementation"); Julie Brandfield, Undue Hardship: Title I of the Americans
with DisabilitiesAct, 59 FoRDHAM L. REV. 113, 115-16 (1990) (discussing how Section 504
of Rehabilitation Act provided "general prohibition" against disability-based discrimination but
failed to specify any "details or definitions").
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(aX4) (1994) (differentiating lack of meaningful legal recourse
available to individuals with disabilities from other historically disadvantaged individuals'
methods of legal redress, and summarizing congressional finding that individuals with disabili-
ties have suffered disability-based discrimination but "often had no legal recourse to redress such
discrimination"); supra note 23 (citing individuals' description of Rehabilitation Act's failings).
31. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at25 (1989), reprintedin LEGSIATiVEHISTORYsupra note
23, at 63 (explaining that wording of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) is "consistent with" Title V of
Rehabilitation Act); see also Chai R. Feldblum, Antidiscrimination Requirements of the ADA,
in IMPLEMENT]NGTHEAMEICANS wrrHDIsABILmsACT35,37 (Lawrence 0. Gostin & Henry
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itly fortified Title I with a broader scope and stronger protections than Title V
of the Rehabilitation Act.3" Unlike Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title
I ofthe ADA is the product of strong public and congressional advocacy by and
on the behalf of individuals with disabilities.33 Title I of the ADA seeks to
enable individuals with disabilities34 to participate in the workforce and to gain
economic independence.3" Congress designed Title I of the ADA to provide
individuals with mental or physical disabilities comprehensive protection
against and remedies for disability-based discrimination in the employment
context.
36
B. Scope of Title I
1. Who Does Title I Protect?
The ADA's protections extend to individuals afflicted with mental, as
well as physical, disabilities. 7 Covered mental disabilities include conditions
A. Beyer eds., 1993) (identifying Sections 501, 503, and 504 of Rehabilitation Act as primary
basis for ADA's substantive protections).
32. See NATIONALCOUNCTL ONDISABILrY, supra note 23, at232 (stating that "[I]egally,
[the ADA] will provide our disabled community with a powerful expansion of protections and
then basic civil rights" (quoting President George Bush's Remarks at ADA Signing)); Miller,
supra note 27, at 704 (explaining way in which ADA broadens Rehabilitation Act's coverage
by including private employers and requiring employers to make reasonable accommodations
for individuals with disabilities).
33. See NATIONAL COUNCIL ONDIsABuzrY, supra note 23, at 14 (describing Section 504
of Rehabilitation Act as "created silently by a group of congressional staff members"). Congress
included the provision in the final version, despite the fact that no one had recommended its
inclusion in congressional hearings, during floor debate, or in the original version of the
Rehabilitation Act Id. In contrast, the forces responsible for enacting the ADA formed "a solid
foundation: of policy, legal principle, personal networks, coalition-forming, and an increasingly
active disability community." Id. at 5; see Rubenstein, supra note 25, at 220 ("There is more
than a technical difference between the Rehabilitation Act's few sentences, passed without
national debate or attention, and a law with both sweeping and comprehensive language and the
attention accompanying a Rose Garden signing ceremony.").
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994) (defining term "disability" as "physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities" of individual).
35. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 10, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at
55 (stating that "critical goal" of ADA is to help individuals with disabilities become "part of
the economic mainstream of our society").
36. 42U.S.C.§12101(b)(1994). Section 12101(b) states thatthe purpose oftheADA is:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimi-
nation against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the
standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities; ....
Id. Title I contains the employment-specific provisions ofthe ADA. Id. § 12112.
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994) (defining "disability" as "physical or mental
impairment").
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commonly thought of as psychological or emotional conditions, as well as
mental deficiencies or injuries."S Title I's protections, however, do not apply
to all individuals with disabilities.
Title I addresses disability-based discrimination only in the employment
setting.39 In defining the terms "employer" and "employee," Congress incorpo-
rated the exact definitions that it used in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII). Congress narrowed the scope of Title I's protections,
however, by prohibiting only those disability-based decisions involving em-
ployees who also are "qualified individuals with disabilities."41  Qualified
individuals with disabilities are individuals who are able, despite their disabili-
ties, to perform the essential functions of the employment positionthey seek or
hold.42 Congress explicitly inserted the "qualified individual with a disability"
limitation to prevent Title I from infringing on an employer's ability to dis-
charge or to reject an individual who is unable to perform the job in question.43
38. SeeS. REP.No. 101-116, at22 (1989), reprinted inLEGIsLATIvEHsTORY, supra note
23, at 61 (defining "mental impairment" as "any mental or psychological disorder, such as
mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning
disabilities"). The EEOC has clarified the term "mental impairment" further by reference to the
current edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders; the manual is helpful, though not conclusive, in determining what conditions
the term "mental impairment" includes. EEOC GUIDANCE ON PSYCHIATRIc DISABILrrIS AND
m AMERIcANs wrI- DIsABILTIEs ACT, reprinted in 59 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) El (March
27, 1997). The EEOC gave some examples of covered emotional illnesses, including "major
depression, bipolar disorder, anxiety disorders... , schizophrenia, and personality disorders."
Id. The EEOC explained that although courts and employers should use the American Psychiat-
ric Association manual as a reference, not all impairments listed therein constitute a disability
under the ADA. Id. at E2. For instance, the ADA does not define either ditug abuse or alcohol-
ism as a protected disability, however, the manual does list them as impairments. Id.
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) (prohibiting employers from engaging in discrimina-
tion against disabled employees).
40. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 42, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23,
at 71 (stating that ADA "incorporates by reference the definition of the term 'employer' and
'employee' used in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f)
(1994) (defining "employee" to mean "individual employed by an employer").
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) (prohibiting employers from "discriminat[ing]
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual" in
employment context).
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994) (defining term "qualified individual with a disabil-
ity" for purposes ofADA). Section 12111 reads:
(8) Qualified individual with a disability
The term "qualified individual with a disability" means an individual with a disability
who, with or without a reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions
of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.
Id.; see S. REP. No. 101-116, at 26, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 63
(clarifying meaning of "essential functions" as "tasks that are fundamental and not marginal").
43. See S. REP. No. 101-116 at26 (1989), reprinted in LEGISLATIVEHISTORY, supra note
23, at 63 (stating that purpose of inserting "qualified individual with disability" requirement is
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2. What Does Title I Prohibit?
Title I of the ADA prohibits private employers44 from engaging in
disability-based employment discrimination.45  Its provisions protect job
applicants and employees with disabilities from receiving discriminatory treat-
ment with respect to their employers' personnel decisions, compensation plans,
training programs, and fringe benefits packages.46 Employer-provided insur-
ance policies or training courses that third parties administer by virtue of a
contractual agreement with the employer also fall within the ambit of Title I's
protections.4
to guarantee employers' freedom to hire and retain only those individuals capable of performing
job). The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources explained in their report that the
purpose of the term "qualified individuals with disabilities" is to "ensure that employers can
continue to require that all applicants and employees, including those with disabilities, are able
to perform the essential, i.e., non-marginal functions of the job in question." Id.
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994) (defining "employer" as entity engaged in
industry affecting commerce and employing 15 or more full-time employees); S. REP. No. 101-
116, at 19 (1989), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 60 (explaining that
ADA is response, in part, to need for legislation prohibiting disability-based employment dis-
crimination in private sector).
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) (defining generally prohibited practices by employ-
ers). Section 12112(a) reads:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions and privileges of employment.
Id.; see S. REP. No. 101-116, at 24-25 (1989), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
23, at 62-63 (explaining scope of coverage should include traditional employment relationship
wherein employers employ at least 15 individuals who work every working day for at least 20
weeks per year).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (prohibiting discrimination in "job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment" (emphasis added)).
47. See id. §12112(b)(2) (including within prohibited discrimination any employer
participation in contractual arrangement with fringe benefit provider that subjects employee
with disabilityto discrimination); see also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 25, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 23, at 63 (defining actions that Title I covers as including "fringe benefits
available by virtue of employment, whether or not administered by the covered entity").
However, Title I covers insurance policies only in the sense that they are employer-provided;
Title V explicitly sets forth the ADA's applicability to the substance of insurance policies. 42
U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994); see David A. Engel, The ADA and Life, Health, and Disability
Insurance: Where is the Liability?, 33 TORT & INS. L. J. 227, 234-35 (1997) (explaining that
§ 12201(c) provides exception from ADA requirements for insurers and other providers of
ERISA plans so long as exempted entity is not using exception to thwart ADA's purpose).
Essentially, the purpose of Section V is to permit insurers to continue using traditional means
of underwriting and classifying risks, provided that the variance in coverage is actuarially-based.
"The legislative history of [Title V] suggests that insured plans may subject a person with a
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3. How Does Title I Work?
The Rehabilitation Act's silence with regard to enforcement hampered
its effectiveness.48 Consequently, Congress expressly incorporated Title VIl's
enforcement procedures and remedies into Title I to ensure that its protections
would be more meaningful than the Rehabilitation Act's.49 By infusing the
substantive protections ofthe ADA with Title VII's remedies and enforcement
powers, Congress intended to empower individuals with disabilities as it had
empowered other historically disadvantaged minorities."0 To improve further
upon the Rehabilitation Act's effectiveness, Congress explicitly directed that
when interpreting or implementing the ADA, courts and agencies should
construe the ADA's standards and requirements as equal to or more stringent
than the Rehabilitation Act's standards and requirements."1
C. Interpreting Title I of the ADA
In crafting the ADA, Congress intended to provide a clear statutory
framework for identifying, redressing, and preventing discrimination against
individuals with disabilities.5 2 As the flood of litigation that has followed the
disability to different coverage terms or conditions based on disability alone, if the disability
poses increased risks." Id. at 234.
48. See Brandfield, supra note 29, at 116 (stating that not until Office of Civil Rights
authored implementing guidelines some years after Rehabilitation Act's passage did Title V
begin fulfilling its potential to end discrimination); supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text
(discussing Rehabilitation Act's lack of enforcement guidance).
49. See 42 U.S.C. 12117(a) (1994) (defining "powers, remedies, and procedures" of Title
VII of Civil Rights Act also to be "powers, remedies, and procedures" of Title I of ADA); H.
REP.No. 101-485, pt 2, at 82 (1990), reprinted in LEGIsLATiVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 328
(defining powers, remedies, and procedures that ADA confers as "the same as, and parallel to"
those contained within Title VII and stating that change in Title VII's enforcement necessarily
causes simultaneous change in ADA's enforcement).
50. See 135 CoNG. REc. S10,711 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 115 (calling ADA "20th century emanci-
pation proclamation" for individuals with disabilities and describing ADA as extension of Civil
Rights Act of 1964); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABImITY, supra note 23, at 155 (discussing
House of Representatives' decision to retain language allowing courts and agencies to impute
to ADA any change in Title VII's enforcement and remedies).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (directing that no court should construe ADA standard as
affording less protection than Title V of Rehabilitation Act unless Congress expressly specifies
otherwise); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(b)-(c) (1998) (same); see also John Parry, Title I-Employmen
in hOimPLE NTiNGTHEAEm ICANS WITHDISABII!IESACT 57,59 (Lawrence 0. Gostin &Henry
A. Beyer eds., 1993) (explaining that under Title I of ADA, individuals with disabilities "enjoy
all the protections found under the Rehabilitation Act... as well as additional protections found
in Title I and its regulations").
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994) (stating purpose ofADA is "to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate" against disability-based discrimination and "to provide clear,
strong, consistent, enforceable standards" for redressing disability-based discrimination).
1352 56 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1341 (1999)
ADA's enactmeht demonstrates, however, the language of the ADA contains
numerous ambiguities and inconsistencies.5' Exactly whom the ADA pro-
tects and what the ADA prohibits, therefore, has become a question for the
courts, turning the question of how to interpret the ADA into a legal battle-
ground.
54
1. Principles of Statutory Interpretation
When Congress writes a statute that is clear on its face and clear in its
effect, a court, should look only to the statute's plain language in construing
the statute.5 If the language of the statute is unclear but Congress has autho-
rized an agency to administer the statute and that agency has issued clarifying
regulations, then courts should defer to the agency if the agency's interpreta-
tion is reasonable.56 Absent a controlling congressional or agency interpreta-
tion, a court should examine the language itself, the context in which Con-
gress used the language, and the legislative purpose in enacting the statute.57
The Supreme Court has held, however, that if the court finds the language
contradictory it should not construe the ambiguity in a way that nullifies or
threatens a substantive right. 8
53. See Charles B. Lynch, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Disability Benefit
Plans, 22 SETON HAL LEGIS. J. 561, 564 (1998) ("tTlhe drafters [of the ADA] forged a
legislative scheme that has probably created more questions and litigation than actually assisting
the individuals that its provisions were designed.to protect').
54. See Lee, supra note 22, at 150 (quoting Congressman Norman Shumway's statement
that ADA "'is a swamp of imprecise language' which 'will mostly benefit lawyers who will cash
in on the litigation' and result in judges writing the 'real' law").
55. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (identifying initial inquiry
of court performing statutory interpretation as to ascertain whether specific language has "plain
and unambiguous meaning"); Chevron U.SA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1994) (stating that court is bound to interpret statute in accordance with
congressional intent if Congress clearly indicated its intent).
56. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (explaining that if Congress has made implicit delega-
tion to agency, then court must defer to agency's interpretation of statute unless interpretation
is unreasonable).
57. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341 (explaining that court should decide whether statute
is plain or ambiguous based on actual language, specific context of language, and context of
statute as whole); United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S.
439,455 (1993) (emphasizing that court must "look to the provisions of the whole law, and to
its object and policy" when construing statute (quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 311
U.S. 579,582 (1849))).
58. See Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Prudence See. Advisory Group, 311 U.S. 579, 582
(1941) (stating that "[a]mbiguities in statutory language should not be resolved so as to imperil
a substantial right which has been granted").
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2. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Interpretation
Primary responsibility for implementing and enforcing the ADA rests
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)."9 In accor-
dance with the previously discussed principles of statutory interpretation, the
Supreme Court has applied only a reasonableness requirement when analyzing
the EEOC's statutory interpretations.'c The EEOC has yetto issue any formal
guidance on the validity of disability-based distinctions in disability insurance
benefit plans.6 However, the agency has argued that the ADA prohibits disa-
bility insurance plans from capping mental, but not physical, disability bene-
fits,' even though it has opined that the ADA permits such distinctions in
health insurance plans.63 In furtherance of its position, the EEOC has taken
an active role in litigating the issue of mental and physical parity in employer-
provided disability plans. The agency has sought to enjoin employers from
terminating mental disability benefits and has filed amici briefs on behalf of
those plaintiffs who have challenged disparity in their disability benefit
plans.' Despite the tradition of according agency interpretations significant
weight in construing statutes, federal courts of appeals thus far have ignored
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(1) (1994) (defining "Commission" as Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission); id. § 12117(a) (bestowing powers, remedies, and procedures for
enforcement of ADA upon "the Commission"); id. § 12206 (c)(2)(A) (granting EEOC authority
to assist covered entities in implementing and complying with Title I requirements).
60. See EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988) (stating that
EEOC's interpretation of statutes for which it bears primary enforcement responsibility "need
only be reasonable to be entitled to deference" (citation omitted)).
61. See Giliberti, supra note 3, at 603 (discussing need for formal EEOC guidance or
regulations with respect to disability insurance plans).
62. See Blakley, supra note 4, at 42 (stating that EEOC has argued that Title I requires
employer-provided long-term disability plans to cover physical and mental disabilities equally);
infra note 64 (cataloging cases in which EEOC has championed argument that disparity in
disability benefits violates ADA).
63. See EEOC INTEIM GUIDANCE ON APPLICATION OF ADA TO HEALTH INSURANCE,
reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) E2 (June 9, 1993) (explaining what constitutes disability-
based distinction). The EEOC Interim Guidance states:
Typically, a lower level of benefits is provided for the treatment of mental/nervous
conditions than is provided for the treatment of physical conditions .... Such
broad distinctions, which apply to the treatment of a multitude of dissimilar condi-
tions and which constrain individuals both with and without disabilities, are not
distinctions based on disability.
Id.
64. See EEOC v. Cigna Corp., No. 98-CV-259 (E.D. Pa. filed Jan. 16, 1998) (filing suit
alleging that differential in mental and physical disability benefits violates Title I of ADA);
EEOC v. Bath Iron Works, No. 97-355-P-H (D. Me. filed Nov. 6, 1997) (same); EEOC v.
Staten Island Say. Bank & Guardian Life, No. 97-5142 (E.D. N.Y. filed Sept. 8, 1997) (same).
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or rejected the EEOC's interpretation of the ADA with regard to parity and
disability benefit levels.6"
IJI. Are Fully Disabled Former Employees Eligible to Sue Under Title I?
Disability recipients challenging disparity between mental and physical
disability benefits first must convince a court that they are entitled to Title I's
protection.66 The difficulty ofthis first hurdle lies in the apparent discrepancy
between what the ADA procedurally requires - individuals with disabilities
who can perform their jobs - and what it substantively protects - nondiscrimi-
nation in disability benefits.67 Two federal courts of appeals that have exam-
ined this apparent discrepancy have precluded fully disabled former employ-
ees from suing under Title 1.68 However, a closer reading of both the language
and the purpose ofthe ADA, as well as reference to its sister statute, Title VII,
supports allowing fully disabled former employees to bring Title I claims
regarding their disability benefits.69
A. Finding Fully Disabled Former Employees Ineligible
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Seventh Circuits
have found fully disabled former employees ineligible to bring Title I claims
regarding employer-provided disability plans that offer less generous benefits
for mental disabilities than for physical disabilities.70 In doing so, both circuits
65. See infra Part IVA (summarizing and analyzing case law rejecting plaintiffs' argu-
ments for parity between physical and mental disability benefit levels).
66. See supra notes 6-12 (identifying question of whether fully disabled former employ-
ees are proper plaintiffs under Title I as primary issue).
67. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 605 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding
"disjunction between the ADA's definition of 'qualified individual with a disability' and the
rights that the ADA confers"), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 850 (1999); Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
982 F. Supp. 1158, 1163 (E.D. Va. 1997) (finding that strictly requiring plaintiff to be "quali-
fied individual with disability" when challenging disability benefits would prevent any plaintiff
from bringing suit and create "enormous . . . gap" in ADA's protections), vacated and re-
manded sub nom. Lewis v. KMart Corp, 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Lee, supra note
22, at 194 (describing "catch-22" that results because courts require individual to prove
disability is sufficiently limiting to render him "qualified individual with a disability" but also
prove that he is able to perform "essential functions" of position).
68. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 187 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding
plaintiff ineligible because she could no longer perform essential functions of job), reh'g
granted on other grounds and rev'd, 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos.,
96 F.3d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); see also Lynch, supra note 53, at 585 (finding that
current law indicates that individual lacks standing to make Title I ADA claim when he is no
longer able to perform job).
69. See infra Part BI.C (analyzing case law on eligibility to file claim under Title I and
finding arguments in support of permitting fully disabled former employees to sue persuasive).
70. See Parker, 99 F.3d at 187-88 (rejecting EEOC argument that "benefits recipient" is
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rely on the Eleventh Circuit's opinion, Gonzales v. Garner Food Services,
Inc.,"1 in which an estate administrator sued a decedent's former employer
alleging that the employer's provision of a health insurance plan that capped
coverage for AIDS-related illness violated Title '72 The court in Gonzales,
in turn, relied upon an Eighth Circuit case interpreting the Rehabilitation
Act.73 Together, these two cases form the foundation for the Sixth and Sev-
enth Circuits' conclusions that fully disabled former employees are not proper
plaintiffs under Title I of the ADA.74
"employment position" under meaning of ADA and refusing to read Title I in way that ensures
disability benefit recipients might be able to challenge provision of those benefits); CNA Ins.,
96 F.3d at 1044 (refusing to equate status as disability benefit recipient with "employment
position" and finding Title VII construction of term "employee" for anti-retaliation claim
inapplicable to disability benefit claim under ADA).
71. 89 F.3d 1523 (1 lth Cir. 1996).
72. See Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1531 (11th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting contention that for purposes of challenging employer-provided fringe benefits,
individuals who are no longer able to perform functions of employment are eligible to sue under
ADA). In Gonzales, the court addressed the question of whether a deceased individual's estate
could sue the decedent's former employer regarding its health benefit policy under Title I of the
ADA. Id. at 1524. The estate sought to challenge the defendant's health insurance policy that
capped AIDS-related health expenses at $40,000. Id. Plaintiff conceded that he was not a
"qualified individual with a disability" under the statute's plain meaning and instead argued that
because Congress included post-employment benefits within the scope of the ADA, it necessar-
ily "must have intended former employees to be protected under the ADA as well." Id. at 1526.
Looking at the ADA's definitions of the terms "discriminate" and "employee," the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found no direct evidence in support of including
former employees under the ADA. Id. Furthermore, the court reasoned, the ADA's legislative
history demonstrated Congress's intent to limit Title I's protections to those individuals able
to perform their job duties at the time of the discriminatory act. Id. at 1527. The court deter-
mined that incorporating a broader definition of employee, and thereby expanding the pool of
eligible plaintiffs, would undermine Congress's actual intent. Id. at 1529. Because the court
found that Congress had defined the term "employee" clearly in the ADA, it reached its con-
clusion without relying on Title VII for assistance in interpreting the term. Id. at 1528. Because
the plaintiff conceded that he could not perform the essential functions of his former position,
the court found him ineligible to bring an ADA claim. Id. at 1531.
Although Gonzales involves a challenge to a health insurance plan rather than a disability
benefit plan, the case is relevant here for its treatment of a former employee in the ADA context,
and because both the Seventh and Sixth Circuit Courts of Appeals relied heavily on the
reasoning and holding in Gonzales in reaching their own conclusions. See infra Part*I]A-.2
(discussing reasoning of courts that reject fully disabled former employees' right to sue under
Title 1).
73. See Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1530 (comparing plaintiff's claim to that of plaintiff in
Beau ford v. Father Flanagan's Boys'Home, 831 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1987), and rejecting claim
based on similar finding that ADA did not provide protection to individuals unable to perform
jobs).
74. See infra notes 95 and 106 and accompanying text (describing Sixth and Seventh
Circuits' reliance on Rehabilitation Act precedent).
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1. The Building Blocks: Gonzales and Beauford
In Gonzales, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the
administrator of a decedent's estate could not bring suit against the decedent's
former employer under Title I of the ADA because the decedent was not an
employee at the time of the alleged discrimination." In arguing that the court
should interpret the term "employee" to include former employees, the plain-
tiff argued that the court, when faced with ambiguous terms such as "em-
ployee" in the ADA, should interpret the ADA's terms to correspond with
those terms' meanings in Title VII.76 The plaintiff argued further that the
EEOC - the agency that Congress charged with interpreting the ADA - had
issued interpretative guidelines that advocated the use of a broader interpreta-
tion of "employee."77 Unpersuaded, the Gonzales court concluded that the
clarity of the ADA's language made reference to Title VII unnecessary.78
Although the court acknowledged that the EEOC formally had indicated its
support for inclusion of former employees within the ADA's protections,79 the
court rejected the plaintiff's argument, reasoning that the more inclusive
interpretation would undermine Congress's intent to limit the ADA's coverage
to those individuals with a disability who could nonetheless perform the
essential functions of their jobs. °
The plaintiff in Gonzales also raised the "employment position" argu-
ment, attempting to analogize receiving health benefits to holding an employ-
ment position.8' Specifically, the plaintiff argued that being a benefit recipient
75. See Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1530 (finding that because decedent had not been qualified
applicant or employee at time of discrimination, ADA did not entitle plaintiff to file claim).
76. See id. at 1527 (summarizing plaintiffs argument that ADA legislative history favors
giving ADA terms same meaning as Congress gave them in Title VII).
77. See id. (summarizing plaintiff s reliance upon EEOC interpretative guidelines
advocating broad interpretation of terms such as "employee").
78. See id. at 1528 (rejecting EEOC's interpretation of "employee" as including former
employees and instead adopting narrow reading of term so as to include only job applicants and
those currently employed). The court found that the "plain language of the ADA clearly
demonstrates" that Congress intended the ADA to protect only applicants and current employ-
ees. Id. Finding the statutory language clear and decisive, the court reasoned that it need not
look to Title VII case law. Id.
79. See id. (acknowledging that EEOC's interpretative guidelines supported broader
interpretation of term "employee"). The court stated, however, that the guidelines were not con-
trolling. Id.
80. See id. at 1529 (concluding that allowing fully disabled former employee to sue
employer would effectively negate Congress's express intent to limit class of eligible ADA
plaintiffs with "qualified individual with a disability" requirement).
81. See id. (summarizing plaintiff's argument that decedent was "qualified individual with




is equivalent to being an employee." Just as an employee must be able to
perform certain duties in order to hold an employment position, the argument
runs, an individual must be able to meet certain conditions in order to receive
disability benefits. 3 An employee who is able, despite a disability, to perform
the essential functions of an employment position is a "qualified individual
with a disability." 4 Similarly, a fully disabled former employee who is able,
despite a disability, to meet the conditions of a disability benefit policy, the
plaintiff argued, is a "qualified individual with a disability."85
The Gonzales court relied on Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys'
Home,86 a Rehabilitation Act case,87 in rejecting the plaintiff's analogy.88 In
Beauford, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded
that under the Rehabilitation Act, an individual with a disability still must be
able to perform the essential duties of his or her job to challenge discrimina-
tion in the provision of health insurance benefits.89 Likewise, the Gonzales
court reasoned that under the ADA, an individual still must be able to perform
the essential duties of his or her job to challenge discrimination in the provi-
82. See id. (explaining employment position argument).
83. See id. (analogizing receiving health benefits to holding employment position).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 831 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1987).
87. See Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 831 F.2d 768, 773 (8th Cir. 1987)
(concluding that fully disabled former employee's claim of discrimination in post-employment
provision of health benefits is not cognizable under Rehabilitation Act). In Beauford, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed whether an individual who no
longer is able to perform the essential duties of her job could bring a Rehabilitation Act claim
regarding provision of post-employment benefits against her employer. Id. at 769. In imple-
menting the Rehabilitation Act, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) defined
a "Qualified Handicapped Person" in four contexts: employment, elementary and secondary
education, post-secondary and vocational education, and other services. Id. at 772. The
plaintiff conceded that her disability precluded her from performing her job. Id. at 771. She
argued, however, that the "other services" provision, not the "employment" provision, governed
her claim regarding employer-provided health benefits. Id. Therefore, she was a proper plain-
tiff under the Rehabilitation Act because her disability qualified her to receive the benefits at
issue. Id. The court rejected her characterization of the claim, finding that HHS had clarified
that "other services" includes general health and velfare programs that the federal government
supports, not health benefits that an employer subsidizes. Id. at 772. Because Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act, the employment section, is the relevant test of eligibility, and it extends
only to individuals with disabilities who are "able to do the job in question," the Court con-
cluded that the plaintiff could not bring her Rehabilitation Act claim. Id. at 772-73.
88. See Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs. Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1530 (11th Cir. 1996)
(comparing plaintiff's claim to that of plaintiff in Beauford and rejecting claim based on similar
finding that statute did not provide protection to individuals unable to perform jobs).
89. See Beauford, 831 F.2d at 772-73 (concluding that plaintiff was ineligible to file
Rehabilitation Act claim because she could not perform essential functions ofjob).
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sion of health insurance benefits.9" Therefore, because the decedent had been
unable to perform his job when the alleged discrimination occurred, the court
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's claim.91 Although
Gonzales involved neither a fully disabled plaintiff nor a disability benefit
plan, it provides the reasoning that the Sixth and Seventh Circuits would adopt
and employ in considering fully disabled plaintiffs' claims regarding their
disability benefits.
2. Courts Rejecting Fully Disabled Former Employees 'Right
to Sue Under Title I
Faced with a different factual predicate but similar legal arguments in
EEOC v. CNA Insurance Cos.,' the Seventh Circuit refused to compel the
plaintiff's former employer to continue paying the plaintiff's mental disability
benefits.93 In CNA Insurance, the plaintiff used the employment position
argument that the estate raised in Gonzales, contending that her status as a
disability recipient was equivalent to holding an employment position.94 The
Seventh Circuit, relying on the holdings in Gonzales and Beauford, rejected
this argument.95 A lawsuit regarding disability insurance benefits, the court
90. See Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1530 (finding, as did Eighth Circuit in Beauford, that "post-
employment benefits recipient" is not "employment position" for which plaintiff was qualified).
91. Id. at 1531.
92. 96 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 1996).
93. See EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting EEOC's
arguments that plaintiff's status as disability recipient equaled employment position with
defendant and that former employees may invoke ADA based on similar allowance of Title VII
suits by former employees). In CNA Insurance, the Seventh Circuit considered the EEOC's
motion to enjoin the defendant employer from terminating plaintiff s mental disability benefits
while the agency investigated the merits of the plaintiff's ADA claim. Id. at 1041. The EEOC
first argued that a disability recipient constitutes an employment position for which the only job
duty is to collect a check. Id. at 1043-44. The plaintiff in CNA Insurance was able to collect
a check; therefore, she was a "qualified individual with a disability" under 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a). Id. The agency also argued that former employees could file suit under Title I
based on the fact that former employees may bring a Title VII challenge against their former
employers. Id. at 1044. The court distinguished Title VII anti-retaliation suits because in the
retaliation suit, the employee's right to pursue protected activity, such as filing a Title VII claim,
arises during the employment period. Id. at 1045. In the plaintiffs case, the court found that
no discriminatory act occurred during plaintiffs employment with CNA. Id. Therefore, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to issue the injunction. Id.
94. See id. at 1043 (summarizing EEOC's argument that plaintiff's "employment posi-
tion" is that of "disability recipient"); supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (explaining
reasoning of employment position argument).
95. See CNA Ins., 96 F.3d at 1044-45 (relying on Gonzales for conclusion that fully dis-
abled former employee cannot bring Title I claim and finding that, as in Beauford, plaintiff's
disabling condition rendered her ineligible to bring suit under ADA).
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reasoned, involves the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment, not
an "employment position."9 6
The EEOC also argued that Title I permits fully disabled former employ-
ees to sue when challenging discrimination in employer-provided disability
benefits, just as Title VII permits former employees to sue when challenging
post-employment retaliation.' The court in CNA Insurance, however, re-
jected the EEOC's Title VII analogy.' Reducing the level of mental benefits
available in a disability benefit plan is not analogous to retaliating against
an individual who engaged in activity protected by Title VII, the court rea-
soned. 9 In the latter, the employee's right to sue stems from a protected
interest that arose during the period of employment." The court found that
an employee possessed no similar interest in the terms of a disability benefit
plan during the period of employment.'
Like the plaintiff in CNA Insurance, the plaintiff in Parker v. Metropoli-
tan Life Insurance Co.1" began receiving disability benefits through an
employer-provided disability plan after severe depression rendered her unable
to work.0 3 Upon notification that her employer would terminate her disability
96. See id. at 1044 (defining "employment position" as "ajob" and characterizing pension
plan as term, condition, or privilege of employment).
97. See id. (summarizing EEOC's alternate argument that former employees may sue
under ADA based on similar rights under Title VII).
98. See id. at 1045 (finding no discrimination in plaintiff's case comparable to discrimina-
tion giving rise to former employee's right to sue under Title VII).
99. See id. (finding that unlike plaintiff in anti-retaliation case, plaintiff in disability
benefit case suffers no harm arising out of employment relationship).
100. See id. (explaining basis for permitting former employees to make post-employment
retaliation claims).
101. See id. (stating that mental disability benefits do not constitute "protected interest").
102. 99 F.3d 181 (6th Cir. 1996).
103. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 184 (6th Cir. 1996) (describing
plaintiffs receipt of disability benefits after diagnosis that she suffered from severe depression),
reh 'g granted on other grounds and rev'd, 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997). In Parker, a fully
disabled individual challenged her former employer's policy of providing mental disability
benefits for a maximum of two years while providing physical disability benefits until a
recipient reaches sixty-five. Id. The Sixth Circuit found the plaintiff ineligible to bring an ADA
claim against the employer because the plaintiff was unable to perform the central duties of her
position and was therefore not a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA. Id. at
187. The court relied on Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 831 F.2d 768 (8th Cir.
1987), which restricted eligible plaintiffs under the Rehabilitation Act to those individuals with
disabilities who could perform their jobs. Id. at 186. In its decision, the Beauford court
acknowledged that its reading of the Rehabilitation Act would prevent redress of discrimination
in benefit provisions. Beauford v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home, 831 F.2d 768, 773 (8th Cir.
1987). Although the Beauford court found this result "undesirable," it found discrimination
in benefit plans to be outside the scope of the Rehabilitation Act Id. The Sixth Circuit also
rejected the plaintiff's arguments that her status as a benefit recipient constituted an "employ-
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benefits after twenty-four months, the plaintiff filed suit alleging that her
employer's limitation on mental benefits violated Title I of the ADA.1 On
the plaintiff's behalf, the EEOC argued that the court should find the fully
disabled plaintiffto be a "qualified individual with a disability" for the limited
purpose of challenging the discriminatory provision of disability benefits." 5
The Sixth Circuit followed the Seventh Circuit in relying on Gonzales and
Beauford 106 to reject the EEOC's argument that being a benefit recipient is
equivalent to holding an employment position."° The EEOC also asked the
Sixth Circuit to consider the remedial nature of the ADA, arguing that apply-
ing the qualified individual limitation in the context of a disability benefit
challenge is incorrect because doing so essentially immunizes discrimination
in disability benefits."0 ' The Parker court refused to view the qualified indi-
vidual limitation as inapplicable to disability benefit suits, concluding instead
that Congress limited the ADA's coverage to prevent an individual who is
unable to perform a job from making any Title I claims."° Shortly after the
Sixth and Seventh Circuits embraced a narrow reading ofthe term "employee,"
ment position" of which she could perform the essential duties. Parker, 99 F.3d at 187.
Dismissing the employment position argument as "creative thinking," the Sixth Circuit found
that to elevate the status of benefits recipient to an "employment position" would contravene
the plain meaning of the ADA's language. Id. The Sixth Circuit, approving the similar reason-
ings of the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits in Gonzales and CNA Insurance, concluded that the
plaintiffwas ineligible to bring suit under the ADA. Id.
104. Parker, 99 F.3d at 184.
105. See id. at 186 (summarizing EEOC's argument that because only individuals unable
to work receive disability benefits, excluding disability benefit recipients from definition of
"qualified individual with disability" would preclude challenge to disability benefit plans under
ADA).
106. See id. at 186-87 (finding reasoning and holdings inBeauford and Gonzales control-
ling in deciding whether fully disabled former employee was eligible to bring Title I claim).
The court compared the plaintiff's situation to that of the plaintiff in Beauford. Id. In Beau-
ford, the Eighth Circuit concluded that although the result was "undesirable," the Rehabilitation
Act did not apply to a claim by an individual who could no longer work due to disability. Id.
107. See id. at 187 (rejecting EEOC contention that status of benefits recipient equals
"employment position" as wholly contrary to congressional intent and ADA language). In
concluding its summary of the EEOC's employment position argument, the court stated that
"[tihe circularity of this reasoning is apparent" Id.at 186; see supra notes 81-85 and accompa-
nying text (explaining employment position argument).
108. See Parker, 99 F.3d at 186 (explaining EEOC argument that barring fully disabled
individuals frustrates ADA's protection of post-employment benefits).
109. See id. at 187 (rejecting plaintiff's eligibility to bring suit under Title I of ADA
because she could not perform essential job functions at time employer allegedly discriminated
in providing disability benefits). The court in Parker acknowledged that Congress may have
intended to permit suits like the plaintiff's, but the court indicated that it was unwilling to read
the ADA as permitting such suits unless Congress amended the ADA to make that intent
explicit. Id.
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however, the Supreme Court rendered a decisionthat would prove valuable for
fully disabled former employees seeking to file Title I suits.110
B. Finding Fully Disabled Former Employees Eligible
Fully disabled former employees succeeded in convincing both the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Third Circuits"' and the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia" that Title I
of the ADA permits them to seek redress against their former employers.
Faced with the task of deciding whether the ADA permitted these fully
disabled plaintiffs to bring suit, these courts emphasized the importance of
interpreting the ADA's language and scope to effectuate the remedial goals
of the ADA.'13 Additionally, these courts relied upon the Supreme Court's
decision in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 4 in which the Court interpreted the
term "employee" in Title VII to encompass former, as well as current and
prospective employees." 5
110. See infra Part lll.B.1 (discussing reasoning and holding in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
519 U.S. 337 (1997)).
111. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 607 (3d Cir. 1998) (resolving
ambiguity of term "employee" in ADA in favor of allowing individuals to sue former employers
regarding individuals' disability benefit packages), cert denied, 119 S. Ct 850 (1999); Castel-
lano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that prohibiting former
employees from challenging provision of disability benefits under Title I of ADA would
undermine remedial purpose of ADA which Congress intended).
112. See Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158,1163 (E.D. Va. 1997) (denying
motion to dismiss plaintiff's ADA Title I claim because he was "qualified individual with a disa-
bility" when employer offered discriminatory plan to him), 7 F. Supp. 2d. 743 (1998) (awarding
judgment to plaintift), vacated and remanded sub nom. Lewis v. KMart Corp., 180 F.3d 166
(4th Cir. 1999). Despite the Fourth Circuit's recent decision vacating the district court opinion
in Lewis based on the substance of the plaintiff's parity claim, the District Court's reasoning
with regard to whether the plaintiff was eligible to sue is useful and instructive to this Note's
analysis.
113. gee Ford, 145 F.3d at 606 (concluding that courts must permit fully disabled former
employees to bring Title I claims "[i]n order for the rights guaranteed by Title I to be fully
effectuated"); Castellano, 142 F.3d at 69 (holding, based on "ADA's broad remedial purpose,"
that fully disabled former employee who performed essential functions of position long enough
to earn fringe benefits could sue under Title I); Lewis, 982 F. Supp. at 1163 (rejecting limited
reading of who may bring Title I claim to avoid contravening ADA purpose of redressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities in all areas of employment context).
114. 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
115. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (holding that in Title VI,
term "employee" includes former as well as current and prospective employees). In Robinson,
the Court addressed the question ofwhether a former employee can invoke Title VII to challenge
his former employer's post-employment retaliation against him for filing a race discrimination
claim with the EEOC. Id. at 339. Examining the statute's plain language, the Court found that
the omission of an explicit modifier such as "current" or "former" rendered the term "employee"
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1. The Intervening Factor: Robinson v. Shell Oil
In Robinson, the Supreme Court considered the question of whether Title
VII's coverage extends to former employees." 6 The plaintiff in Robinson
brought suit under Section 704(a) of Title VII,'" which forbids an employer
from retaliating against an employee because the employee filed or assisted
another employee in filing a discrimination charge under Title VII. s" The
plaintiff, however, was a former employee, and in drafting Section 704(a),
Congress failed to specify whether the term "employee" in Section 704(a)
includes former, as well as current employees." 9 Finding the statutory lan-
guage unclear, the Court turned to the question of how to construe the term
"employee" as used in Title VII. 20
The Court rejected the argument that Congress's explicit inclusion of
former employees in other statutes precluded the possibility of implicit
inclusion,' 2' especially in light of Congress's clear intent that former employ-
ambiguous as to its inclusion of former employees. Id. at 341-343. Although in some sections
of Title VII the term "employee" plainly refers only to either current or former employees, the
Court determined that the existence of those sections did not foreclose the possibility that in
Section 704(a), the relevant section in Robinson, the term could include both current and former
employees. Id. at 343. The Court also rejected the argument that inclusion of the term "appli-
cants" necessarily rendered the omission of the term "former employees" dispositive because
"applicants" includes individuals who might never be employees. Id. at 344-45. Finding the,
plain language ambiguous, the Court turned to the broader context of Title VII. Id. at 345.
Several sections of Title VII include protection for discriminatory discharge; therefore, the Court
reasoned that a limited reading of the term "employee" as only referring to current employees
would contradict the purpose of the statute. Id. at 346. The Court held that including former
employees within the meaning of the term "employee" was consistent with and better served
Title VII's purpose: "[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms." Id.
116. Id. at 339.
117. Id.
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994) (forbidding employers from discriminating against
employees who oppose unlawful employment practices or participate in attempts to stop
unlawful employment practices).
119. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341 (discussing fact that Congress did not modify "em-
ployee" with temporal word such as future or present). The Court examined not only
Section 704(a) of Title VI, which was at issue in Robinson, but also examined Section 701(f),
which defined the term "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer." See id. at 342
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994)) (rejecting argument that "employed" necessarily means "is
employed").
120. See id. at 345 ("Finding that the term 'employees' in [Section] 704(a) is ambiguous,
we are left to resolve that ambiguity.").
121. See id. at 342 (rejecting argument that Congress's express use of "former employees"
in other statutes means that absence of word "former" in Title VII definitively precluded former
employees). The Court explained that such evidence of other statutes' language "proves only
that Congress can use the unqualified term 'employees' to refer only to current employees, not
that it did so in this particular statute." Id.
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ees utilize some of Title VlI's remedies."z In accord with its tradition of
deferring to the enforcing agency, the Court also considered the EEOC's
interpretation of the term "employee" in Title VI.'" The EEOC argued that
barring former employees from utilizing Section 704(a) would motivate
employers to discharge potential Title VII claimants in order to avoid liability
and thus leave a large number of discrimination victims without legal
redress. 24 This argument persuaded the Court that Title VII's purpose re-
quires a court to include former employees within the scope of coverage that
Section 704(a) provides." Otherwise, the Court reasoned, an individual
would be without legal recourse once discharged, a consequence that would
thwart the purpose of Title VII's anti-retaliation provisions. 2 '
2. Courts Upholding Fully Disabled Former Employees'
Right to Sue Under Title I
Fully disabled former employees succeeded in bringing an ADA claim
under Title I in Castellano v. City of New York, 27 the first case to use the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Robinson." Castellano, a Second Circuit deci-
122. See id. (highlighting Title VII's authorization of courts to order employers to reinstate
or hire employees who were victims of discrimination). The Court explained that Sections
70 6(gX1) and 717(b) of Title VII give courts remedial powers including "reinstatement or hiring
of employees," and because an employer "does not reinstat[e] current employees, that language
necessarily refers to former employees." Id. (citations omitted).
123. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text (discussing EEOC's role in interpreta-
tion of ADA and weight that Supreme Court accords those interpretations).
124. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,346 (1997) (describing consequence of
barring former employee suits as giving employers "perverse incentive" to fire potential Title
VII claimants and "undermin[ing] the effectiveness" of Title VII).
125. See id. (concluding that term "employee" must include former employees in order to
realize Title VI's goal of providing statutory remedies for discrimination). The EEOC argued
specifically that if the Court were to exclude former employees from Title VII claims, employers
would be able to (1) deter potential Title VII claimants through threat of post-employment retal-
iation or (2) thwart the statute's purposes simply by firing employees who might bring such
claims. Id.
126. See id. (concluding that context in which Congress used "employee" and broad
purpose of Title VII support inclusion of former employees within term's scope).
127. 142 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 1998).
128. See Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that
prohibiting fully disabled former employees from challenging provision of retirement benefits
under Title I of ADA would undermine remedial purpose that Congress intended ADA to have).
The court in Castellano considered retired and fully disabled former city employees' ADA claims
against the City offNew York. Id. at 64. The Second Circuit modeled its analysis after Robinson,
evaluating (1) the plain language, (2) the term "qualified individual with a disability" in its
statutory context, and (3) the purpose and context of the statute as a whole. Id. at 67. Just as
Congress did not temporally modify the term "employee" in Title VII, it similarly failed to specify
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sion, involved fully disabled retirees who alleged that the defendant violated
Title I by conditioning the level of benefits available to retirees on whether a
disability forced the individual to retire. 29 Looking at the plain meaning of
Title I, the Castellano court could not reconcile Title I's prohibition on dis-
crimination in the provision of post-employment benefits with the provision's
requirement that a plaintiff be able to perform the "essential functions" of the
job in order to sue. 130 The court examined two specific concerns that the ADA
addresses: (1) preventing individuals with disabilities from experiencing
discrimination in employment benefits"3 and (2) ensuring that employers
remain free to refuse to employ unqualified individuals with disabilities."'
The Castellano court reasoned that including former employees within
the class of individuals eligible to bring ADA suits furthers the first objective
without jeopardizing the second objective.'33 Disability benefit claims, like the
post-employment retaliationclaims in Robinson, do not materialize until the
plaintiff's employment terninates.I 4 Therefore, prohibiting former employees
at what point an individual had to be "a qualified individual with a disability" able to perform the
"essential functions" of the job in order to file an ADA claim regarding fringe benefits. Id.
Congress inserted the "qualified individual with a disability" limitation to prevent the statute from
forcing employers to hire or retain individuals unable to perform the "essential functions" oftheir
positions. Id. at 68. An individual challenging the provision of disability benefits does not seek
to be reinstated, therefore, in the limited context of redressing post-employment benefits, "Con-
gress's expressed concern about qualifications is no longer implicated." Id. The court concluded
that "[p]rovided that retired employees were qualified ... while employed and on that basis
became entitled to post-employment benefits, the purpose of the 'essential functions' requirement
has been met" Id. After finding that reading the term "qualified individual with a disability" to
permit lawsuits by former employees furthered, not contravened, the ADA's purpose, the court
concluded that former employees are eligible to bring suit under Title VII. Id. at 69.
129. See id. at 62 (describing facts of Castellano). Although Castellano does not address
the issue of mental parity, it is applicable to this discussion because it addresses the identical
eligibility issue of whether a fully disabled former employee may make a Title I claim regarding
post-employment benefits.
130. See id. at 67-68 (explaining that literally requiring individual to be able to perform
"essential functions" of position at time of discrimination would permit employer to discrimi-
nate with impunity in its provision of post-employment benefits).
131. See id. at 68 (discussing Congress's intent to prevent discrimination in provision of
fringe benefits which "are paid out to those who no longer work and who are no longer able to
work, and some fringe benefits are paid out to individuals precisely because they can no longer
work").
132. Id. at 67-68.
133. See id. at 68 (reasoning that, for purposes of remedying discrimination in disability
benefits, including former employees within Title I's protections does not interfere with
employers' discretion to refuse to hire unqualified individuals).
134. See id. (stating that employee's right to post-employment benefits arises during




from challenging their post-employment disability benefits would render much
of Title I's protection a nullity.13 Allowing-fully disabled former employees
to file Title I claims regarding their post-employment benefits, the Castellano
court concluded, achieves the ADA's remedial purpose but does so without
infringing upon employers' right to make legitimate hiring and discharge
decisions.136
Building on the reasoning in Robinson and Castellano, the Third Circuit
in Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp.137 joined the Second Circuit in pernmitting
a fully disabled plaintiff to challenge her post-employment benefit plan under
the ADA.13 The Ford court found that the plaintiff's position exposed an
incongruity within Title 1.139 The incongruity stems from the fact that Title I
appears to apply only to individuals who, despite their disability, can perform
their jobs; however, Title I also applies to discrimination in disability benefits,
for which individuals are not eligible unless and until they are unable to
perform their job duties. 4 ' The Supreme Court's reasoning in Robinson and
its inquiry into the meaning of the term "employee"14' guided the Third Cir-
135. See id. (explaining that barring former employees from bringing discrimination claims
under ADA regarding post-employment benefits would thwart express purposes of §§ 12112(a)
and (bX2) of ADA).
136. See id. at 67-68 (finding that "[w]here the alleged discrimination relates to the pro-
vision of post-employment benefits, rather than to hiring, promotion, or firing, Congress's
expressed concern about qualifications is no longer implicated").
137. 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998).
138. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 607 (3d Cir. 1998) (construing
language of Title I to permit disabled former employees to sue former employers regarding
disability benefits), cer. denied, 119 S. Ct. 850 (1999). In Ford, the court addressed the
question of whether an individual receiving disability benefits from her former employer could
challenge the provision of those benefits under the ADA even though she could no longer
perform the essential functions of her former position. Id. at 605. The court found that the
ADA contains an "internal contradiction." Id. Title I requires that plaintiffs be able to perform
the essential functions of their jobs; however, Title I also protects against discrimination in
disability benefits, for which individuals do not become eligible until they are unable to perform
their jobs. Id. at 605-06. This discrepancy rendered the statute ambiguous and required the
court to determine how to reconcile the contradiction in order to effectuate fully both the statute
and its purpose. Id. at 607. Relying on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Robinson, the court
concluded that the term "employee" encompasses both current and former employees. Id. at
606-07. The Court determined that this broader interpretation better achieves the remedial
purpose of the ADA and ensures protection of "the full panoply of rights guaranteed by the
ADA." Id. at607.
139. See id. at 605 (describing how plaintiff's case "illuminates an internal contradiction
in the ADA itself").
140. See id. at 605-06 (finding Title I ambiguous as result of "disjunction" between rights
that Title I confers and standards it requires for filing suit).
141. See id. at 606 (stating that Robinson decision bolsters argument in favor of including
former employees within term "employee" and applying reasoning of Supreme Court).
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cult's inquiry in Ford. Relying on Robinson, the Third Circuit reached the
conclusion that a reasonable interpretation of Title I would have to include
former, as well as current, employees under the provision's protection.'42
Furthermore, the -court found, interpreting Title I to allow suits by fully dis-
abled former employees better accomplishes the ADA's purpose.143
The third case to allow a fully disabled individual to sue his former
employer on the theory that the employer-provided, long-term disability bene-
fit plan violated Title I of the ADA was Lewis v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,144
which the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
decided. 4s The Fourth Circuit recently vacated the opinion based on the
district court's disposition of the parity argument,146 but this Note argues that
the district court's opinion is still instructive. In Lewis, the plaintiff received
disability benefits because of his severe depression, a condition from which
he also suffered, albeit to a lesser extent, while employed. 47 Alleging that the
employer's disability benefit package violated Title I by providing less gener-
142. See id. at 608 (interpreting "employee" to include former employees based on lack of
temporal qualifier and describing Robinson as "impetus" for conclusion).
143. See id. at 606 (finding that if ADA is to guarantee meaningful rights, Title I must
permit suits by individuals who are no longer able to meet strict definition of "qualified
individual with a disability").
144. 982 F. Supp. 1162 (E.D. Va. 1997), vacated and remanded sub nom. Lewis v. KMart
Corp., 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999).
145. See Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1162 (E.D. Va. 1997) (finding
plaintiff's broad reading of Title I of ADA for purposes of challenging disability benefits to be
more rational interpretation of statute's language), vacated and remanded sub nom. Lewis v.
KMart Corp., 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999). InLewis, the court resolved the conflict between the
requirement that a plaintiff be a "qualified individual with a disability" in order to file an ADA
claim and the ADA's purpose of providing a statutory basis for attacking disability-based dis-
crimination in fringe benefits and employee compensation. Id. at 1163. In permitting the
plaintiff to pursue his ADA claim, the court reasoned that although at the time the plaintiff filed
suit he was not a "qualified individual with a disability," he had been so qualified when the
defendant offered him the disability benefit plan at issue. Id. at 1162. When the defendant
offered the disability plan at issue to the plaintiff, the plaintiff was suffering from depression but
still could perform his job duties. Id. The court pinpointed the discrimination as occurring at the
time when the defendant offered the plaintiff the plan, even though the resulting injury occurred
when the plaintiff lost his disability benefits. Id. Therefore, the plaintiff was a "qualified
individual with a disability" when the defendant discriminated against him. Id. The court found
that the language and purpose of Title I support this interpretation because, otherwise, discrimi-
nation in disability benefits would be impervious to challenge. Id. at 1163. The Lewis court
distinguished the decisions in Parker and CNA Insurance because in those cases the plaintiffs did
not become disabled until after having accepting their employer-provided disability plans. Id.
146. See generally Lewis v. KMart Corp., 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999) (vacating and
remanding district court decision in Lewis v. Aetna Insurance Co.).
147. See Lewis, 982 F Supp. at 1162 (describing plaintiff's history of depression and
ability to perform job despite depression at time defendant offered benefit plan).
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ous benefits for long-term mental disabilities than for long-term physical disa-
bilities, the plaintiff brought an ADA action against his employer. 4 The
defendant employer moved to dismiss the plaintiff's suit, reasoning that for
purposes of filing a Title I claim, the plaintiff was no longer a qualified
individual with a disability. 49
In assessing the defendant's motion, the court first determined that the
discrimination giving rise to the plaintiff's suit occurred when the defendant
offered the benefit plan at issue."' The plaintiff's condition when he actually
filed the claim, therefore, is irrelevant in determining whether the plaintiff is
eligible to bring a Title I claim."' The time at which the defendant ceased
providing the benefit, according to the court, was merely the time when the
injury giving rise to the cause of action occurred. 5
The plaintiff was able to work despite his depression at the time the
defendant offered the benefit plan at issue in Lewis.'53 Therefore, under the
court's reading of Title I, the plaintiff was a qualified individual with a disabil-
ity when the discriminatory act occurred.' To find otherwise would, to a large
extent, defeat Congress's purpose in extending substantive protection against
disability-based discrimination to disability benefit recipients, the court
explained.155 The Lewis court concluded that if an employer offers a qualified
individual with a disability a benefit plan that violates the ADA, that individual
may later file an ADA claim regardless of his status at the time he files suit. 56
148. See id. at 1160 (summarizing plaintiff's claim regarding disparity between mental and
physical disability benefits).
149. See id. at 1161-62 (outlining defendant's argument, based on holding in Parker, that
plaintiff's inability to perform essential functions of job precluded him from bringing Title I
challenge).
150. See id. (identifying defendant's offer of benefit plan as discriminatory act and point
when benefits ceased as time of resulting injury).
151. See id. at 1162 (concluding that plaintiff's right to file ADA claim "vested" when he
was "qualified individual with a disability").
152. See id. (explaining how plaintiff's inability to hold job at time of injury is irrelevant
as long as he was "qualified individual with a disability" at time of discrimination).
153. See id. at 1163 (explaining that plaintiff met requirements for being "qualified
individual with disability" when defendant offered plaintiff employee disability benefit plan).
154. See id. (finding plaintiff eligible to bring claim).
155. See id. (describing consequence of forbidding fully disabled individuals from chal-
lenging employer-provided disability plans as creating "[s]o enormous a gap in the protection
afforded by Title I" that it would be "clearly at odds with the expressed purpose of the ADA").
156. Id. The court distinguished Parker and CNA Insurance because in those cases the
defendants offered the plaintiffs disability plans before the plaintiffs became disabled. Id.
When, as in Parker and CNA Insurance, disability does not occur until after the employer offers
the benefit plan to the individual, the court explained, the plaintiff may never have been a quali-
fied individual with a disability, Id.
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C. Analysis of Fully Disabled Former Employees'Right
to Sue Under Title I
To give effect to Title I's purpose, a court should construe the apparent
discrepancy between what Title I protects and whom it deems is a proper
plaintiff in favor of those whom Congress designed the statute to protect -
individuals with disabilities. The Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits, however, wrongly rejected fully disabled former employees as proper
Title I plaintiffs. 57 First, both courts failed to recognize that the "qualified
individual with a disability" limitation is inapplicable in the context of disabil-
ity benefit claims because the individual is not seeking employment.'
58
Second, the factual predicate in Gonzales differs significantly from those in
Parker and CNA Insurance, making the Sixth and Seventh Circuits' reliance
on Gonzales misplaced.'59 Additionally, Gonzales incorrectly relies on Re-
habilitation Act precedent, despite the differences between the Rehabilitation
Act and the ADA, and erroneously distinguishes Title VII anti-retaliation
cases interpreting the scope of the term "employee."'" The Sixth and Seventh
Circuits perpetuate the flawed reasoning of Gonzales, both inthe reliance they
place upon Gonzales and in the reasoning they employ in their own rulings. 6
1. Cross Purposes: The Qualified Indivdual Limitation and
Post-Employment Benefits
Resolving the issue of whether a fully disabled former employee may
bring a Title I action regarding disability benefits requires a court to reconcile
two apparently contradictory goals of Title I: (1) preventing discrimination in
benefits available only to individuals unable to work because of disability and
(2) limiting relief to individuals able to work despite their disability.'62 To
157. See supra Part 11_A2 (outlining reasoning and holdings of Sixth and Seventh Circuits
in Parker and CNA Insurance).
158. See infra Part HII.C.1 (explaining primacy of Title I's remedial purpose and finding
"qualified individual with a disability" limitation only applicable to ADA suits in which
employment performance is at issue).
159. See infra Part II.C.2 (distinguishing Gonzales because of differences in type of
benefits at issue and status of plaintifti).
160. See Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1162,1163 (ED. Va. 1997) (uphold-
ing fully disabled former employees' right to file Title I disability claim by comparison with
former employees' right to file Title VII anti-retaliation claim), vacated and remanded sub nona.
Lewis v. KMart Corp., 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999).
161. See infra Parts III.C.3.a-b (explaining reasons why Title VII precedent should trump
Rehabilitation Act precedent in suits regarding disability benefit recipients who are former
employees).
162. See supra note 67 (listing courts' descriptions of apparent contradiction between what
Title I substantively protects and procedurally requires).
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make Title I comprehensive in its coverage of employment discrimination,
Congress expressly prohibited discrimination in employee benefits. 63 With
respect to disability benefits, effectuating this goal is particularly important
because long-term disability benefits replace, not merely supplement, em-
ployee salaries." Barring a fully disabled former employee from bringing suit
renders the ADA's substantive protection of disability benefits hollow because
no plaintiff can surmount the eligibility obstacle.165 The Castellano, Ford, and
Lewis courts, recognizing the primacy of honoring Title I's broad remedial
purpose, correctly refused to interpret Title I as barring fully disabled former
employees from suing regarding their disability benefits under the ADA. 66
By contrast, the Parker and CNA Insurance courts' refusal to permit fully
disabled former employees to sue under Title I stems primarily from a misdi-
rected desire to give effect to the "qualified individuals with a disability"
limitation. 67 In using this phrase, Congress did intend to circumscribe the
163. See S. REP.No. 101-116, at6 (1989),reprintedin LEGIsLATIVEHISTORY, supra note
23, at 53 (explaining that "[d]iscrimination also includes exclusion, or denial of benefits . . .");
id. at 25, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 63 (prohibiting discrimination
in "rates of pay or any other form of compensation and changes of compensation"); supra note
47 (summarizing ADA language that explains how fringe benefits fall within ambit of Title I
protection).
164. See Lynch, supra note 53, at 570 (describing disability benefits as "a type of wage
replacement"); see also notes 1-6 and accompanying text (outlining general attributes of disa-
bility benefit plans).
165. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 606 (3d Cir. 1998) (rejecting
reading of ADA that would make individuals eligible for disability benefits and individuals able
to redress discrimination in those benefits two mutually exclusive groups), cerL denied, 119 S.
Ct. 850 (1999); Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding it
"inconceivable ... that Congress would in the same breath expressly prohibit discrimination in
fringe benefits, yet allow employers to discriminatorily deny or limit post-employment benefits
to former employees who ceased to be 'qualified'"); Lewis, 982 F. Supp. at 1163 (concluding
that adopting defendant's argument that former employees are ineligible under Title I would
"prevent any plaintiff from challenging" discrimination in employer-provided fringe benefits).
166. Ford, 145 F.3d at 607 (permitting former employees to bring Title I claims in order
"to effectuate the full panoply of rights guaranteed by the ADA"); Castellano, 142 F.3d at 68
(rejecting defendant's contention that former employees are ineligible to bring Title I claim
because result would "undermine the ADA's broad remedial purpose to prohibit disability dis-
crimination in all aspects" of employment); Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1162,
1163 (E.D. Va. 1997) (rejecting narrow reading of who may bring Title I claim as "clearly at
odds with the expressed purpose of the ADA"), vacated and remanded sub nom. Lewis v.
KMart Corp., 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999).
167. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 186 (6th Cir. 1996) (conclud-
ing that legislative history indicates Congress did not intend to include fully disabled former
employee within Title I's protection); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir.
1996) (stating that plaintiff's inability to hold "employment position" disqualified her from
bringing a Title I claim); cf. Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs. Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1529 (11th Cir.
1996) ("[I]nterpreting the ADA to allow any disabled former employee to sue a former em-
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class of eligible Title I plaintiffs; however, Congress did so merely to protect
an employer's discretion to hire and to retain only those individuals capable
of performing their jobs."e In the context of disability benefits, however, an
existing employment contract requires an employer to compensate fully dis-
abled former employees for work that they already have performed. 69 If a
court finds that an employer's provision of this compensation violates the
ADA, the court does not require the employer to reinstate the fully disabled
plaintiffs; the court merely requires the employer to fulfill its existing obliga-
tion in a nondiscriminatory manner." ° Therefore, reading the statute to
include former employees for the limited purpose of challenging post-employ-
ment benefits effectuates Title I's substantive protection of employee benefits




The factual background in Gonzales distinguishes it from cases involving
fully disabled former employees and employer-provided disability recipients.
The plaintiff in Gonzales was not a former employee, but was the administra-
ployer essentially renders the QID requirement under the Act, that an individual with a disability
hold or desire a position the essential functions ofwhich he or she can perform, meaningless.").
168. SeeS. REP. No. 101-116, at 26, reprinted in LEGISLATVE HISTORY, supra note 23,
at 63 ("By including the phrase 'qualified individual with a disability,' the Committee intends
to reaffirm that this legislation does not undermine an employer's ability to choose and maintain
qualified workers."); id. (explaining that "the point of' requiring an "individual with a disabil-
ity" to be able to perform the essential functions ofjob is to protect employers' right to hire and
maintain capable workforce). Inserting the "qualified individual with a disability" condition in
Title I also prevents situations in which the specter of an ADA lawsuit forces an employer to
hire or retain an unqualified individual with a disability. See id. (emphasizing that limitation
is in place to reinforce idea that ADA does not require employer to choose individual with
disability over more qualified individual without disability).
169. See Castellano, 142 F.3d at 67 (stating that fringe benefits "are earned during year of
service before the employment has terminated but are provided in years after the employment
relationship has ended"); Tucker, supra note 12, at 921 (concluding that barring former
employees from challenging provision of disability benefits "clearly seems to defeat the purpose
and spirit" of Title I based on fact that fully disabled former employees "are entitled to receive
[disability benefits] due to their former employment relationship").
170. See Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 7 F. Supp. 2d 743, 750 (E.D. Va. 1998) (ordering
defendant to continue paying monthly disability payments to successful plaintiff until plaintiff
reaches age 65 or recovers from disability), vacated and remanded sub nom. Lewis v. KMart
Corp., 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999).
171. See Castellano v. City ofNew York, 142 F.3d 58,68 (2d Cir. 1998) (concluding, after
examining ADA's legislative history, that "[w]here the alleged discrimination relates to the
provision of post-employment benefits, rather than to hiring, promotion, or firing, Congress's
expressed concern about qualifications is no longer implicated").
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tor of the deceased former employee's estate.172 Furthermore, Gonzales in-
volved a challenge to a cap on health insurance benefits, not disability insur-
ance benefits.173 An employee has the opportunity to challenge discrimination
in health benefits while employed, whereas an individual who suffers injury
from discrimination in disability benefits only has standing to sue after the
disability has rendered him unable to work. These differences in the plain-
tiff's status and the benefit plan at issue make Gonzales's holding generally
inapplicable to the situation in which filly disabled former employees sue
regarding their disability benefits. The flaws in the Eleventh Circuit's reason-
ing in Gonzales and the Sixth and Seventh Circuits' reliance thereon further
weaken the position of those courts that refuse to permit fully disabled former
employees to sue.
174
3. Competing Tools ofInterpretation
a. The Rehabilitation Act
The courts in Parker, CNA Insurance, and Gonzales all relied heavily
upon Beauford v. Father Flanagan 's Boys'Home, a Rehabilitation Act case
involving employment benefits. 7 ' Although Congress did intend for the
Rehabilitation Act to provide a logical starting point for analyzing ADA
language,'76 Rehabilitation Act precedent does not necessarily control courts'
interpretations of the ADA.'7 7 Defining the ADA's coverage by the bound-
172. See Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1523 (describing plaintiff as "[a]dministrator of the Estate
of Timothy Bourgeois, decesed, Plaintiff-Appellant").
173. See id. at 1524 (summarizing decedent's continued payment ofhealth premiums post-
termination in order to extend his health insurance). In Gonzales, the decedent was eligible to
continue his health insurance plan post-employment provided that he continue to pay his
premiums. Id. This situation differs from post-employment benefits, which are essentially wage
replacement benefits and which an employee's work history entitles him to receive.
174. See supra Parts 11.C.1-2 (explaining flaws in reasoning that courts use to find former
employees ineligible to bring Title I claim).
175. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 186 (6th Cir. 1996) (approving
district court's reliance on Beauford in interpreting "qualified individual" under ADA), reh'g
granted on other grounds and rev'd., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos.,
96 F.3d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir. 1996) (approving Eighth Circuit's finding in Beauford that
Rehabilitation Act did not cover fully disabled individual's claim); Gonzales v. Garner Food
Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1530 (11th Cir. 1996) (summarizing Beauford conclusion that
Rehabilitation Act did not cover fully disabled individual's claims and finding that Beauford
governed similar claim under ADA).
176. SeeS. REP.No. 101-116,at 84 (1989),reprintedinLGsLAT=VEHISTOlRY, supranote
23, at 92 (stating that implementing bodies should construe ADA as affording no less protection
than Rehabilitation Act); id. at 21 (defining term "disability" by reference to Section 504 of
Rehabilitation Act).
177. See Miller, supra note 27, at 745 (arguing that courts should temper their reliance on
Rehabilitation Act precedent when purpose, substantive protections, or implementation of ADA
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aries of the Rehabilitation Act contravenes Congress's intent to enact disabil-
ity discrimination legislation that is more comprehensive than the Rehabilita-
tion Act.1 8 Viewing the ADA as infused with not only the Rehabilitation
Act's substantive protections but also Title VII's broad remedial purpose and
powers better adheres to Congress's intent in enacting the ADA.'7 9
b. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
Since the Gonzales and CNA Insurance decisions, the Supreme Court has
held in Robinson that in Title VII, the term "employee" includes former
employees for purposes of anti-retaliation suits."' Because the ADA explic-
itly adopts not only Title VII's definition of the term "employee,"181 but also
the statute's enforcement rights and remedies, 18 the Robinson ruling seriously
diminishes the validity of the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits' narrow readings
of "employee." In view of Robinson, these explicit incorporations, and the
fact that the former employees already have earned their disability benefits,
it follows that the ADA, like Title VII, should protect former employees' right
to challenge their employers' provision of disability benefits.8 3
ADA disability benefit claims are analogous to, not distinguishable from,
anti-retaliation claims, contrary to the opinions of the Eleventh and Seventh
Circuit Courts of Appeals.'84 Anti-retaliation claims form the substance of
and Rehabilitation Act differs); Parry, supra note 51, at 58-59 (stating order of importance for
interpreting Title I of ADA as follows: (1) EEOC regulations, interpretive appendix and ex-
planations, (2) legislative history, (3) interpretations of and case law regarding Section 504 of
Rehabilitation Act, and (4) ADA compliance manual published by EEOC and Department of
Justice).
178. See supra Parts IIA.1-2 (describing Congress's intent to improve upon Rehabilitation
Act through enactment of ADA).
179. See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABITY, supra note 23, at 20 (describing 1964 Civil
Rights Act and 1973 Rehabilitation Act as "twin pillars" of ADA). The Civil Rights Act of
1964 constitutes the "philosophical foundation" of anti-discrimination law and the Rehabilita-
tion Act serves as the "framework for applying nondiscrimination to persons with disabilities."
Id. at 181.
180. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (holding that term "em-
ployee" in Section 704(a) of Title VII includes former, as well as current, employees).
181. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing that term "employee" in ADA
incorporates Title VII's meaning of term).
182. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (stating incorporation of Title VII remedies
and enforcement powers in Title I).
183. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 607 (3d Cir. 1998) (concluding
that affording former employees right to file ADA claim is in keeping with rights afforded
former employees under Title VII), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 850 (1999); Castellano v. City of
New York, 142 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 1998) (same).
184. See EEOC v. CNAIns. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039,1045 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that, unlike
anti-retaliation claim in which protected interest develops during employment, ADA claim
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both Robinson and the pre-Robinson Title VII case law on which the plaintiffs
in CNA Insurance and Gonzales relied." 5 Title VII prohibits post-employ-
ment retaliation when the employer takes retaliatory action in order to punish
the former employee for participating, while employed, in activity that Title
VII protects.186 Because the employer's impetus for taking retaliatory action
occurred while the plaintiff was an employee, a nexus to the employment
relationship exists even though the actual discrimination occurred post-
employment."s If protection frompost-employment retaliation is to be mean-
ingful, the Supreme Court emphasized in Robinson, it must extend to former
employees.
1 88
An individual qualifies to participate in an employer-provided disability
benefit plan when he is an employee, but he can receive the benefits only after
his disability precludes him from being an employee.189 As with protection
against post-employment retaliation or wrongful discharge, protection against
discrimination in post-employment benefits can be effective only if former
employees can utilize it."9 Therefore, procedural concerns, as well as policy
regarding benefits does not ripen until post-employment); Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs. Inc.,
89 F.3d 1523, 1528 (1lth Cir. 1996) (stating that plaintiff's supporting Title VII case law is
"easily distinguishable" because it involved anti-retaliation claims).
185. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 339 (phrasing question facing court as whether term
"employee" in Section 704(a), Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, includes former employees);
CNA Ins., 96 F.3d at 1045 (explaining that plaintiff's argument involves court's own anti-
retaliation precedent); Gonzales, 89 F.3d at 1528 (explaining that plaintiff's supporting Title
VII case law involves anti-retaliation claims).
186. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (concluding that post-
employment retaliation by employer against former employee is cognizable under Title VII anti-
retaliation provision).
187. See CNA Ins., 96 F.3d at 1045 (explaining that when employer retaliates after
discharging employee, that retaliation is cognizable under Title VII because it has "nexus" to
employment relationship).
188. See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346 (agreeing with EEOC's contention that barring former
employee suits under Title VII would thwart statute's remedial purpose by allowing employers
to "retaliate with impunity against an entire class of acts under Title VII - for example, com-
plaints regarding discriminatory termination").
189. See Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58, 68 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing that
individuals earn disability benefits while employed but receive benefits post-employment).
190. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 606 (3d Cir. 1998) (recognizing
that if ADA requires plaintiff to be qualified individual at time of suit then disabled employee
loses his ability to challenge discriminatory post-employment benefits), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
850 (1999); Castellano, 142 F.3d at 68 (rejecting interpretation of ADA that would bar former
employee suits because such interpretation would frustrate clear purpose of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12112(a) and (b) in preventing discrimination in fringe benefits); Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1163 (E.D. Va. 1997) (declining to bar former employee suits because
doing so would "effectively prevent any plaintiff from challenging an employer's provision of
disability benefits as discriminatory under Title I of the ADA"), vacated and remanded sub
nona. Lewis v. KMart Corp., 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999).
1374 56 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1341 (1999)
and precedent, support allowing fully disabled individuals to sue regarding
their disability benefit plans under Title I of the ADA. Finding otherwise
eviscerates the ADA's protection of disability benefits by effectively eliminat-
ing challenges to disability benefit plans and thereby ensuring that disparate
levels of mental and physical disability benefits continue.'9 '
IV Parity in Long-Term Disability Benefit Levels for Mental
and Physical Disabilities
As many as thirty-three million individuals have mental disabilities
severe enough to qualify them for protection under the ADA."9 The nation's
growing awareness of this problem has given momentum to the movement for
treating mental disabilities on a par with physical disabilities."9 Unfortu-
nately, the ADA does not offer an explicit answer as to whether it mandates
parity in disability benefits, leaving courts with the task of designing an
answer to this question.'94 Thus far, the federal courts of appeals that have
faced the issue have refused to interpret Title I as requiring employers to
provide equal levels of mental and physical disability benefits. 95
Current law on the issue ofparity, however, is wrong. Title I ofthe ADA
does require employers to provide mental disability benefits at the same level
at which they provide physical disability benefits.' 96 Although the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals recently vacated the Eastern District of Virginia's
disposition of Lewis v. Aetna Life Insurance,"9 the District Court's analysis
191. See Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 937 (declaring that barring individuals who receive
disability benefits from bringing ADA claims "has dire consequences for successful implemen-
tation of the ADA"); id. at 938 (stating that refusing to hear substantive discrimination claims
that disability recipients bring "allows the very discrimination the law was enacted to address
to continue unabated").
192. See Rubenstein, supra note 25, at 211 (citing survey stating that 3.3 million non-
institutionalized Americans suffer from mental disorders "that seriously interfere with one or
more aspects of daily life").
193. See Blakley, supra note 4, at 42 (explaining that debate over disparity in mental and
physical benefits increased after passage of ADA); Giliberti, supra note 3, at 603 (reporting
frequent inquiries about and administrative complaints regarding disparity in employer-provided
health and disability benefit plans).
194. See Giliberti, supra note 3, at 600-01 (lamenting Congress's failure to include discus-
sion of how Title rs prohibitions on discrimination affect disability-based distinctions in health
and disability plans); Lynch, supra note 53, at 564 (describing Congress's treatment of insur-
ance benefit issues as "ambiguous" and "legislative scheme that has probably created more
questions and litigation than actually assisting" individuals with disabilities).
195. See supra note 15 (cataloging treatment of parity claims by federal courts that have
addressed issue of parity).
196. See infra Part IV.B (concluding that Title I of ADA mandates parity between levels
of employer-provided physical and mental disability benefits).
197. See Lewis v. KMart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 167 (4th Cir. 1999) (vacating district court
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and reasoning inLewis offers an interpretation of Title I that correctly relies on
Congress's intent in enacting the ADA and federal case law interpreting similar
civil rights statutes. It is this opinion, and not the constricted readings that the
courts of appeals have given Title I, that illuminates the manner in which courts
should address claims for parity in disability benefits under the ADA.
A. Case Law on Parity in Long-Term Disability Benefits
The plaintiffs in Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., Parker v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance, EEOC v. CNA Insurance, and Lewis v. Aetna Life Insurance
all filed claims under the ADA alleging that the discrepancy between the
levels of mental and physical disability benefits contained in their employer-
provided disability insurance plans violated Title I of the ADA.1" In Lewis,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that
Title I prohibits an employer from offering individuals with mental disabilities
less extensive disability benefits than those offered to individuals with physi-
cal disabilities."' The other three courts, and the Fourth Circuit in its opinion
vacating the District Court's opinion in Lewis, however, reached the opposite
result and rejected the plaintiffs' substantive parity arguments.2"
1. Courts Rejecting the Parity Argument
In CNA Insurance, the EEOC brought suit on behalf of a former em-
ployee alleging that the employer's reduction in coverage of mental disabili-
ties violated Title I of the ADA." 1 When the former employee had begun
judgment in favor of plaintiff claiming disparity in mental and physical disability benefits
violated Title I of ADA).
198, See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601,603 (3d Cir. 1998) (summarizing
plaintiff and EEOC's argument that ADA requires employer-provided disability benefit plan
to include equal benefits for mental and physical disability), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct 850 (1999);
Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 187 (6th Cir. 1996), reh 'ggranted on other
grounds and rev'd, 121 F.3d 1006, 1008 (6th Cir. 1997) (same); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96
F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158,1160
(E.D. Va. 1998) (same), vacated and remanded sub nom. Lewis v. KMart Corp., 180 F.3d 166
(4th Cir. 1999).
199. See Lewis, 982 F. Supp. at 1168 (concluding that ADA prohibits benefit plans from
conditioning duration of disability benefit payments on whether disabling condition is mental
or physical).
200. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 608 (concluding that Title I does not recognize claim based on
disparity between mental and physical benefits); Parker, 121 F.3d at 1015 (stating that ADA
does not mandate parity in disability benefits); CNA Ins., 96 F.3d at 1044 (concluding that ADA
does not protect against discrimination among individuals with disabilities, only discrimination
against such individuals); Klfart, 180 F.3d at 170 (finding employer-sponsored long-term
disability plan that provides different levels of benefits for mental and physical disabilities not
violative of Title I of ADA).
201. See CNA Insurance, 96 F.3d at 1041 (explaining procedural aspect of case).
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working for the defendant, her long-term disability package covered both
mental and physical disabilities from the time of onset until age sixty-five.2°
Subsequently, however, the defendant reduced coverage of mental disabilities
to two years, while continuing to cover physical disabilities from the time of
onset until age sixty-five. °3 In its suit, the EEOC claimed that this reduction
in benefits violated Title I of the ADA by discriminating against those em-
ployees who contracted mental disabilities.2°
The Seventh Circuit began its inquiry by looking at congressional debate
on the issue of parity in health benefits, rather than in disability benefits. °"
In 1996, Congress had defeated a measure that would have required parity in
health benefits. 2" This defeat, although different in substance and six years
subsequent to the ADA's passage, convinced the court that Congress did not
intend the ADA to require parity in disability benefits.
207
In view of this related legislative debate and the absence of explicit lan-
guage mandating parity, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the defendant's reduc-
tion in its coverage of mental disability benefits did not constitute disability-
based discrimination because the plan still was available to all employees
regardless of disability.0 8 Title I ofthe ADA, the court explained, prohibits an
employer from offering individuals with disabilities benefit plans that provide
lesser coverage or the same coverage at a higher cost.20 9 A plan that offers the
same benefit package to all its employees on an equal basis, however, complies
with the ADA regardless of what the benefit package includes.210 Therefore,
the court upheld the benefit policy in CNA Insurance."'
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See id. (outlining EEOC's investigation and filing of suit after former employee filed
ADA claim regarding disparate benefit levels with EEOC).
205. See id. at 1044 (postulating that even mental health advocates did not view ADA as
mandating parity when they debated parity amendment to Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act).
206. See id. (explaining that Congress defeated amendment proposing to include parity
requirement in Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act).
207. See id. (concluding that defeat of parity amendment in post-ADA legislation indicated
that parity requirement is not within scope of ADA).
208. See id. at 1045 (stating that reducing mental disability benefits while defendant
employed plaintiff did not constitute discriminatory act).
209. Id. at 1044.
210. See id. (reasoning, based onAlexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), that as long
as all employees receive offer of identical coverage, terms of that coverage are irrelevant for
ADA purposes). In admitting that such a result was unsatisfying, the Seventh Circuit referred
to the plan and stated that, "[t]his may or may not be an enlightened way to do things, but it was
not discriminatory in the usual sense of the term," Id.
211. See id. at 1045 (finding that former employee experienced no disability-based discrim-
ination).
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The next court to confront a parity claim was the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit in Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance."2 In Parker, the
Sixth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff was ineligible to sue; nevertheless,
the court went on to discuss and reject the substantive merit of plaintiff's
parity claim.213 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that if Congress actually had
intended the ADA to mandate parity in insurance, it would not have subse-
quently needed to pass the Mental Health Parity Act (M-PA). 4 Addition-
ally, the EEOC's interim guidance, which suggests that a lower level of
mental health insurance benefits does not necessarily violate the ADA, also
persuaded the court to reject the plaintiffs claim."'
In addition to this extrajudicial evidence, the court relied on precedent
interpreting the Rehabilitation Act as prohibiting only discrimination between
individuals with disabilities and those without disabilities." 6 Cases interpret-
212. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1008 (6th Cir. 1997) (en
bane) (outlining plaintiff's claim that disparity in benefit levels constitutes violation of ADA).
213. See id. at 1015 (approving district court's dismissal of plaintiff as ineligible, but never-
theless discussing substantive merits of plaintiff's claim). The court's dismissal of the action on
the issue of eligibility renders its substantive discussion mere dicta. However, because other
courts rely on it as controlling, this Note addresses and examines the court's reasoning.
214. See id. at 1018 (reasoning that if Congress had intended ADA to require parity in
health insurance, it would not have needed to enact Mental Health Parity Act to mandate parity
in lifetime and annual health benefits).
215. See id. (quoting EEOC's interim guidance differentiating between distinctions based
on disability and those made that equally affect individuals with and without disabilities).
216. See id. at 1016 (comparing plaintiff's argumentto those made in Traynor v. Turnage,
485 U.S. 535 (1988), Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), and Modderno v. King, 82
F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). In Traynor, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether
the Veterans' Administration's (VA) refusal to extend plaintiffs' educational assistance benefits
based on the VA's characterization of alcoholism as "willful misconduct" violated the Rehabili-
tation Act. See Traynor, 485 U.S. at 538. The Supreme Court ruled that although alcoholism
is a disability that the Rehabilitation Act covers, the VA excluded alcoholics not based on their
disability, but rather "because they engaged with some degree of willfulness in the conduct that
caused them to become disabled." Id. at 550. Therefore, the Court upheld the VA's refusal to
extend the plaintiff's access to educational benefits as not violating the Rehabilitation Act. Id.
at 551.
Alexander involved a Rehabilitation Act challenge to a state program that limited the
number of inpatient hospital days reimbursable by Medicaid for individuals both with and
without disabilities. See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 289. The Court ruled that the facially neutral
limitation's disparate impact upon individuals with disabilities was not sufficient to constitute
a violation of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 309.
In Modderno, the plaintiff alleged that the Foreign Service Benefit Plan, which fixed
lifetime coverage for mental health benefits at $75,000 but did not set a fixed limit on physical
health benefits, violated the Rehabilitation Act. Modderno, 82 F.3d at 1060. The D.C. Circuit
viewed the different limitations as distinguishing between types of illnesses, not individuals.
Id. at 1061. If the Supreme Court upheld the validity of general benefit limitations and caps in
Alexander, the court reasoned, then a partial limitation must also be valid. Id. at 1062. The fact
that the Plan did not cap physical health benefits actually benefitted individuals with disabilities
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ing the Rehabilitation Act uniformly hold that the Act does not recognize
distinctions among individuals with different disabilities.217 Congress must not
have intended the ADA, the Parker court therefore determined, to eradicate
distinctions in disability benefits among individuals with different disabili-
ties. 1 The court concluded that the ADA requires only that an employer
offer all its employees the same plan; the fact that the offered plan makes
disability-based distinctions is not sufficient to violate the ADA.219
Next, in Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit weighed in on the issue of parity in disability benefits.22 ° The
plaintiff in Ford brought a challenge to an employer-provided disability bene-
fit plan that capped mental disability benefits after two years but did not
similarly cap physical disability benefits. The Third Circuit, like its sister
circuits, concluded that the ADA does not require a disability insurance plan
to cover physical and mental disabilities equally.'m
To support its conclusion that the ADA does not require parity, the court
relied primarily on precedent indicating that the Rehabilitation Act does not
require equal treatment of different types of disabilities.' The court also
reasoned that if Congress had intended for the ADA to mandate mental and
"as a class," whereas imposing caps on both kinds of benefits would disadvantage individuals
with both kinds of illness. Id. To read the Rehabilitation Act as requiring a plan to impose
additional caps actually would penalize individuals with disabilities and thereby contravene the
purpose of the law. Id. Therefore, the court concluded, the plaintiff failed to state a claim under
the Rehabilitation Act Id. at 1063.
217. See supra note 216 (explaining holdings in Rehabilitation Act cases).
218. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1019 (6th Cir. 1997) (find-
ing that ADA does not prohibit making disability-based distinctions among individuals with
disabilities in benefit plans).
219. See id. (stating that ADA outlaws discrimination against individuals with disabilities
but "does not mandate equality between individuals with different disabilities").
220. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 603 (3d Cir. 1998) (explaining
issue as "purely legal question of whether a disparity between disability benefits for mental and
physical disabilities violates" ADA), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 850 (1999).
221. Id. at 603.
222. See id. at 608 (stating that plan providing different coverage for beneficiaries does not
violate ADA).
223. See id. at 608-09 (summarizing factual situations, reasoning, and holdings in Traynor,
Alexander, and Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1979)); supra note 216 (summarizing
reasoning and holdings in Traynor and Alexander). The Third Circuit also discussed its
reasoning in Colautti, a case in which the plaintiff alleged that a Pennsylvania statute that did
not limit its coverage of private hospitalization, but limited its coverage of private hospitaliza-
tion in a mental institution to 60 days, violated the Rehabilitation Act. See Colautti, 592 F.2d
at 706. Looking to the "Analysis of Final Regulation" of the Rehabilitation Act, the court found
that the Analysis did not support plaintiff's argument for parity in hospitalization. Id. at 708-09.
The court concluded that Congress, in passing the Rehabilitation Act, only intended to ensure
that a government program or benefit was available equally to individuals with disabilities, not
to mandate that the program provide additional services to those individuals. Id.
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physical parity in benefit plans, it would have made that evident in the ADA's
legislative history.' Furthermore, the court placed weight on the fact that
Congress passed the MHPA after already having passed the ADA; this fact,
according to the court, indicated that the ADA, as currently written, does not
require parity between mental and physical insurance benefits.2" The court
concluded that rather than governing the terms of the benefit package, the
ADA governs only the means by which the employer offers the benefit plan
to individuals with disabilities."
Faced with a challenge to the same type of benefit plan as in Ford,22 7 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, in Lewis v.
Aetna Life Insurance Co., ruled that a disability benefit plan that provides
lesser benefits to recipients who suffer from mental disabilities rather than
physical disabilities does violate Title I' Although the Fourth Circuit has
vacated this opinion,2' this Note contends that the reasoning that the district
court employed in Lewis, particularly the application of ADEA precedent, is
the proper means of addressing and resolving the issue of parity in disability
benefits."
2. Lewis v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. and Lewis v. KMart Corp.
In Lewis v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., the plaintiff sued his employer after
learning that he would lose his employer-provided disability benefits after two
224. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 610 (relying on Senate report to explain that employer may
provide policy that limits amount or kind of treatment provided so long as amount provided is
available equally to individuals with and without disability). The court also pointed to Con-
gress's rejection of an amendment to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
that would have required insurers to cover mental and physical illnesses equally. Id. If the
ADA already mandated parity, the Court reasoned, consideration of such an amendment would
be unnecessary. Id.
225. See id. (finding that Mental Health Parity Act does not address disability benefits, and
its passage subsequent to passage of ADA demonstrates that ADA does not contain parity
requirements).
226. See id. (finding no discriminatory action in provision of insurance plan as long as
employer offers every employee same plan regardless of whether employee is currently dis-
abled). In justifying its conclusion, the court stated that to find otherwise would destabilize the
current insurance market Id.
227. See Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158,1159 (E.D. Va. 1997) (summa-
rizing plan's coverage of physical disabilities up until age 65 and of mental disabilities for two
years), vacated and remanded sub nom. Lewis v. KMart Corp., 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999).
228. See id. at 1169 (concluding that absent actuarial justification, benefit policy that
provides differing level of coverage for physical and mental disabilities violates Title I of ADA).
229. See Lewis v. KMart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 172 (4th Cir. 1999) (vacating district court
opinion awarding plaintiff past and future disability benefits).
230. See inffra Part IV.B (analyzing legal and policy arguments over parity and concluding
that Title I of ADA mandates parity).
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years because his benefit plan classified his disability as mental. 1 Lewis
alleged that KMart's disability package violated Title I by discriminating
against individuals whose disabilities were mental in nature. 2 After conclud-
ing that the plaintiff was eligible to sue under Title I, the Eastern District of
Virginia addressed the question of ;hether discrimination among individuals
with disabilities constitutes a violation of the ADA.z3
Initially, in denying the defendant-employer's motion to dismiss," the
Lewis court first examined § 12201(c) of the ADA, which is a "safe harbor"
provision that limits the statute's substantive protection with regard to insur-
ance benefits. " 5 The safe harbor provision permits an employer to offer
benefitplans that make disability-based distinctions, but onlyto the extentthat
the offeror can demonstrate that it created the distinction based on actual
231. See Lewis, 982 F. Supp. at 1159-60 (explaining factual predicate of case).
232. Id.
233. See id. at 1166 (summarizing plaintiff's argument in favor of interpreting § 12201(c)
as prohibiting benefit plans that differentiate among individuals with disabilities based on their
disability and summarizing defendant's argument that ADA does not prohibit differentiating
among individuals with disabilities provided that plan is equally available to all individuals with
or without disabilities).
234. See id. at 1169 (denying defendants' motions to dismiss); see also supra note 145
(summarizing factual predicate and general reasoning of Lewis).
235. See Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1185, 1165 (E.D. Va. 1997) (noting
defendants' argument that Section 12201(c) of ADA circumscribes scope of protection that
substantive Titles ofADA afford). Section 12201(c) states:
Insurance. - Subehapters I through III of this chapter and title IV of this Act shall
not be construed to prohibit or restrict -
(1) an insurer, hospital or medical service company, health maintenance
organization, or any agent, or entity that administers benefit plans, or similar
organizations from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such
risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law, or
(2) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsor-
ing, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are
based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that
are based on or not inconsistent with State law, or
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsor-
ing, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that is not
subject to State laws that regulate insurance.
Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes
of subehapters I and III of this chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (1994). The legislative history of the ADA indicates that with regard
to benefit plans, paragraph (2) is the relevant provision for employers. See S. REP. No. 101-
116, at 85 (1989), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 93 ("Point (2) recog-
nizes the need for employers, and/or agents thereof, to establish and observe the terms of
employee benefit plans, so long as these plans are based on underwriting or classification of
risks.").
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differences in the risk, and therefore, the cost, that the disability poses.
Essentially, § 1220 1(c) requires that the distinctions adhere to traditional risk
classification principles and not be an attempt to evade the ADA.37 To fall
within the ADA's safe harbor provision, an employer or insurer must draw any
disability-based distinction carefully and base the distinction on the estimated
cost of covering a particular disability; the safe harbor provision, the court
reasoned, does not protect a broad-brush distinction between physical and
mental disabilities.3 8
The court next moved to the defendant's contention that CNA Insurance
and Parker - both of which concluded that disparity in disability benefit plans
does not violate Title I - were dispositive of the parity claim in Lewis as
well. 9 The court first noted that the CNA Insurance and Parker courts
rendered decisions on the issue of eligibility, making their discussion of parity
mere dicta.24 Additionally, the Rehabilitation Act cases on which the Sixth
and Seventh Circuits had relied were not controlling based on differences in
both the type of benefit at issue and the fact that neither involved "explicit
discrimination against a particular category of disability.""24 Finally, the court
noted, even if the Rehabilitation Act would permit discrimination in the form
236. See Lewis, 982 F. Supp. at 1166 (relying on legislative history of ADA in determining
meaning of safe harbor provision), vacated and remanded sub nom. Lewis v. KMart Corp., 180
F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999). The Lewis court quoted at length from the ADA's legislative history,
stating:
Moreover, while a plan which limits certain kinds of coverage based on classifica-
tion of risk would be allowed under this section, the plan may not refuse to insure,
or limit the amount, extent, or kind of coverage available ... solely because of a
physical or mental impairment, except where the refusal, limitation, or rate differen-
tial is based on sound actuarial principles ....
Id. (citations omitted).
237. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 85, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23,
at 93 (explaining Section 501(c) to mean that ADA does not upset otherwise legal insurance
plan that limits coverage in manner that disadvantages individuals with disabilities if empirical
underwriting data supports limitations).
238. See Lewis, 982 F. Supp. at 1166 (summarizing legislative history of 42 U.S.C.
§ 12201(c)); see also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 84,reprinted in LEGISLATIVEHISTORYsupra note
23, at 92 (stating that ADA does not insulate disability-based distinctions in insurance if
disability at issue "does not pose increased risks"); id. at 85 (explaining that under ADA,
covered plan "may not.., limit the amount, extent, or kind of coverage available" unless issuer
bases decision on "sound actuarial principles or [it] is related to actual or reasonably anticipated
experience").
239. See Lewis, 982 F. Supp. at 1166-67 (outlining defendants' reliance upon CNA Insur-
ance and Parker).
240. See id. at 1167 (explaining that cases on which defendants relied "were decided on
so-called 'standing' issues").
241. Id. at 1167 n.8.
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of disparate levels of coverage, Congress passed the ADA precisely because
the Rehabilitation Act had proved inefficient and too narrow to remedy
discrimination effectively.242
Finding the conclusion of various courts of appeals unsatisfactory, the
court placed weight upon the EEOC's position243 and the purpose and lan-
guage of the ADA.244 The court reasoned that a benefit policy that treats
mental disabilities differently than physical disabilities violates the ADA
because individuals with mental disabilities receive lesser coverage based
solely on their disabilities.24 The defendant's argument that the ADA permits
distinctions between the two types of disability, provided that the distinctions
do not differentiate between individuals with disabilities and those without
disabilities, failed to persuade the court.246 The court ruled that disability-
based discrimination occurring among individuals with disabilities has the
same unwanted and unwarranted discriminatory effect as when it occurs
between an individual with a disability and one without a disability.247
The Lewis court relied on O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers
Corp.,249 an Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) case in which the
Supreme Court held that the ADEA prohibits age discrimination even if the
individual whom the discrimination benefits falls within the age group that the
ADEA protects.249 By analogy, the Eastern District of Virginia concluded that
242. See id. ("Furthermore, even if such distinctions are valid under the Rehabilitation Act,
the ADA was enacted because 'current laws [e.g. the Rehabilitation Act] were "inadequate" to
combat the pervasive problems of discrimination that people with disabilities are facing."'
(citations omitted)).
243. See id. at 1168 (noting EEOC's advocacy in attempting to remedy distinctions in
coverage of mental and physical disabilities in disability benefit plans).
244. See id. (finding argument that discrimination on basis of disability is acceptable
among individuals with disabilities counter to purpose and language ofADA).
245. Id. at 1168.
246. See id. (finding defendant's argument illogical because extension of theory would
permit employer to "hire an employee with a physical disability over a more qualified employee
with a mental disability solely because of the mental disability").
247. See id. (stating that permitting disability-based discrimination among individuals with
disabilities "flies in the face of the language of the ADA").
248. 517 U.S. 308 (1996).
249. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996)
(concluding that ADEA does not allow employer to discriminate between two individuals that
ADEA covers). In O'Connor, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the defendant
employer's decision to fire the 56-year-old plaintiff and replace him with a 40-year-old, whom
the ADEA also protected, violated the ADEA. Id. at 309-10. The Court identified the question
as being what elements a plaintiff must present to state an ADEA claim. Id. at 311. The ADEA
prohibits discrimination against an individual who is 40-years-old or older on the basis of that
individual's age. Id. at 312. The Court reasoned that it is irrelevant whether the discriminatory
act benefitted the person within the class of persons that the ADEA protects. Id. The key
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the ADA prohibits all disability-based discrimination, not merely disability-
based discrimination that favors some individuals without disabilities."
Ruling in favor ofthe plaintiff, the court ordered the defendant to pay past and
future disability benefits.251
One year later, in Lewis v. Kiart Corp.,2 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded Lewis v. Aetna Life
Insurance Co."3 The Fourth Circuit in Klvart essentially reiterated its deci-
sion in Rogers v. Department ofHealth and Environmental Control,24 a case
involving a parity claim under Title II of the ADA. 5 Rogers presented the
element in an ADEA claim is that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff because of
the plaintiff's age. Id. Therefore, the Court concluded, "[t]he fact that one person in the pro-
tected class has lost out to another person in the protected class is thus irrelevant, so long as he
has lost out because of his age." Id.
250. See Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158,1169 (E.D. Va. 1997) (constru-
ing ADA, in light of O'Connor, to "prohibit discrimination against individuals based on their
specific disability, and not merely to prohibit discrimination that negatively affects the disabled
as a class"), vacated and remanded sub nom. Lewis v. KMart Corp., 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir.
1999).
251. See Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 7 F. Supp. 2d 743,750 (E.D. Va. 1998) (concluding
that concerns about awarding back relief are not present in Lewis and awarding retroactive
benefits and continuation of disability benefits while plaintiff remains eligible recipient),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Lewis v. KMart Corp., 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999). The
court computed the defendant's total liability, provided plaintiff remained disabled until age 65,
to be $654,532.77. Id. at 751.
252. 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999).
253. See Lewis v. KMart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 172 (4th Cir. 1999) (vacating Lewis v.
Aetna Insurance Co. and remanding case to district court with instructions to enter judgment
for KMart). In KMart, the Fourth Circuit held that a defendant employer's provision of a
disability benefit plan that provides lesser coverage for mental disabilities does not violate Title
I of the ADA. Id. at 168. After hearing oral arguments in ivart, the Fourth Circuit had issued
an opinion in which the court rejected a substantially identical claim under Title I[ of the ADA.
Id. at 169 & n.3; see also infra note 255 (explaining factual predicate and legal conclusions in
Rogers v. Department ofHealth andEnvt'l Control, 174 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 1999)). The court
then examined the relevant provisions of Title I and Title 11. Id. at 170. Finding "no material
distinction," the court adopted its reasoning in the Title 11 case and held that Title I does not
require disability benefit plans to treat mental disabilities on a par -with physical disabilities.
Id. In doing so, the court also rejected the plaintiff's contention that the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the ADEA as prohibiting discrimination among individuals within the pro-
tected class should likewise apply to the ADA. Id. at 171-72. The court reasoned that the
Supreme Court had never before held that discrimination among individuals with disabilities
violated the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act; therefore, the court was unwilling to read such a
requirement into the ADA_ Id.
254. 174 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 1999).
255. See KMart, 180 F.3d at 170 (outlining reasoning in Rogers v. Deptartment of Health
andEnvt'l Control, 174 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 1999) and finding it controlling of issue in Lewis);
Rogers v. Department of Health and Envt'l Control, 174 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 1999). In Rogers,
a former employee brought suit against his employer, the Department of Health and Environ-
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court with a parity claim substantively identical to the one in Lewis, the only
difference being that Rogers involved Title II, not Title I, of the ADA. 6
In Rogers the Fourth Circuit concluded that Title II of the ADA did not
require South Carolina to cover physical and mental disabilities equally. 7
The reasoning that the court employed to deny the plaintiffs claim mirrored
that which its sister circuits had used to deny similar claims alleging that Title
I of the ADA required parity in disability benefits. Congressional history
relating to health insurance legislation and cases addressing parity claims
under the Rehabilitation Act factored prominently in the Fourth Circuit's dis-
position of Rogers, and, in turn, of KMart."
The KMart court did face an argument that the plaintiffinRogers had not
presented. Based on the Supreme Court's decision in O'Connor making dis-
crimination among individuals whom the ADEA protected actionable, the
plaintiff argued that discrimination among individuals whom the ADA pro-
tects should likewise be prohibited." 9 The KM'art court offered two reasons
mental Control (DHEC). Id. at 432. The plaintiff claimed that his state-provided long-term
disability plan violated Title II of the ADA by providing lesser coverage for long-term mental
disabilities. Id. The district court dismissed the plaintiff's case for failure to state a cognizable
claim under Title II of the ADA. Id. Like its sister circuits, the Fourth Circuit looked first to
similar Rehabilitation Act language and precedent. Id. at 433. Relying on Alexander v. Choate
and Traynor v. Turnage, as had the Third, Sixth and Seventh Circuits, the Rogers court deter-
mined that because the Rehabilitation Act permitted distinctions among disabilities, tho ADA
did as well. Id. at 434. This conclusion conformed to the EEOC's interim guidance with regard
to parity in health insurance, which the court found instructive despite the fact that the guid-
ance's applicability was limited to health insurance. Id. at 435. The court also emphasized
congressional debate regarding the MHPA, which the court read to intimate that Congress had
not intended the ADA to mandate parity. Id. at 436. Ultimately, the court concluded,
"[e]verything we have considered - from pre-ADA Supreme Court cases on the Rehabilitation
Act to post-ADA congressional activity - leads us to one conclusion: the ADA does not require
South Carolina to provide the same level of benefits for mental and physical disabilities in its
long-term disability plan for state employees." Id.
256. See Kart, 180 F.3d at 169 n.3 & 170 (explaining timing of Rogers decision and
stating conclusion that Title H of ADA does not require state employer to provide parity in dis-
ability benefits).
257. See Rogers, 174 F.3d at 437 (concluding that plaintiff making claim for parity in
benefits failed to state claim under Title If of ADA).
258. See id. at 433 (stating that "[t]he Rehabilitation Act is the most appropriate starting
point for our discussion"). The Fourth Circuit anchored its reasoning in Rogers to Alexander
v. Choate and Traynor v. Turnage, id., both of which the other courts of appeals considered
central to their decisions against requiring parity. See supra notes 210, 216, 223 (discussing
reasoning in and reliance on Rehabilitation Act precedent).
259. See Lewis v. KMart Corp., 180 F.3d 166,171 (4th Cir. 1999) (summarizing plaintiffs
claim that "inasmuch as he received disability benefits for a shorter period of time because his
disability was a mental disability, he 'has lost out because' of his disability and, therefore, under
O'Connor, he has a viable claim under Title I").
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for rejecting this argument. First, the Supreme Court had not previously held
distinctions among disabilities to be violative of the ADA or the Rehabilita-
tion Act.2" Second, the KMart court simply stated that "our federal disability
statutes are not designed to ensure that persons with one type of disability are
treated the same as persons with another type of disability."261 After conclud-
ing its cursory analysis ofthe O'Connor argument, the Fourth Circuit held that
Title I of the ADA does not require parity in disability benefit plans.262
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Kfart, rather than the District Court's
opinion in Lewis, is legally controlling. However, thus far the Fourth Cir-
cuit's narrow interpretation of the scope of protection afforded by civil rights
laws has not survived Supreme Court review. Both Robinson and O'Connor,
which this Note argues are instructive and controlling to analyzing the ADA,
are cases in which the Supreme Court has reversed the Fourth Circuit and
rejected that court's constricted readings of the civil rights laws.263
B. Analyzing the Issue of Parity in Long-Term Disability Benefits
With the exception of the Eastern District of Virginia in Lewis, federal
courts have interpreted Title I too narrowly in concluding that disability plans
providing different levels of benefits for mental and physical disabilities are
not violative of Title I. First, these courts have relied on evidence relating to
the debate over parity in health benefits, despite the fact that health and disa-
bility benefits differ vastly in their availability, purpose, and use.2" Second,
the courts have adhered to Rehabilitation Act precedent rather than embracing
more applicable and more recent ADEA and Title VII precedent.26
1. Distinguishing Disability Benefits from Health Insurance Benefits
Employers, and arguably courts, are reluctant to provide mental disability
benefits on par with physical disability benefits because they fear that doing
260. See id. at 171 (relying on Traynor for proposition that Supreme Court has not and will
not hold distinctions among disabilities violative of ADA or Rehabilitation Act).
261. Id. at 171-72.
262. Id. at 172.
263. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,339 (1997) (reversing en bane opinion
by Fourth Circuit which had held that term "employee" in Title VII did not include former
employees); O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996)
(reversing Fourth Circuit opinion that upheld discrimination among individuals that fell under
protection of ADEA).
264. See infra Part IV.B.1 (distinguishing health and disability benefits).
265. See infra Part 1V.B.2 (explaining how ADEA and Title VII's emphasis on individual
nature of rights support plaintiff's claim that discrimination among individuals with disabilities
violates Title I of ADA).
1385
1386 56 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1341 (1999)
so will increase the number and cost of long-term disability claims. 6  The
ADA, however, only protects individuals who suffer from severely limiting
conditions,267 and long-term disability benefits require individuals to prove
that they suffer from conditions that render them unable to work and that will
continue into the foreseeable future.2" This heightened showing, greatly
diminishes the number of individuals eligible or able to feign eligibility for
mental disability benefits.269
In terms of cost, under the majority of disability plans, full disability
benefits entail providing payments to an individual from onset of disability
until age sixty-five.27 The overwhelming majority of disability insurance
beneficiaries, however, do not become eligible to begin receiving benefits
until their fifties or sixties.2  The relatively short duration between the aver-
age onset of disability and age sixty-five diffuses the cost argument by making
the financial gap between the two years of coverage that most plans currently
provide and full coverage far less expensive for providers to bridge.
Courts also rely on precedent, legislative history, and agency guidelines
addressing health benefits when faced with the question of parity in the con-
266. See Blakley, supra note 4, at 42 (justifying use of time-limiting mental disability
benefits because "overutilization and abuse of benefits is substantial and becoming even greater"
(internal citations omitted)); Miller, supra note 27, at 710 (explaining employers' fear of
proliferation of mental disability claims based on perception that mental disability is simple to
fake); Christopher Aaron Jones, Special Project, Legislative "Subterfuge"?: Failing to Insure
Persons with Mental Illness Under the Mental Health Parity Act and the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct, 50 VAND. L. REv. 753,764 (1997) (concluding that case for mandating mental
health parity is sound except that mandate would create additional economic costs).
267. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994) (explaining that disability sufficiently severe to
qualify individual for ADA coverage "substantially limits one or more of the major life activities
of such individual"); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 23, at 61 (defining major life activities to mean "caring for one's self, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working").
268. See 44 AM. Ju.R 2D Insurance § 1488 (1982) (summarizing majority position that
"permanent disability" in disability income insurance context means that individual is "unable
at any time to perform any work or engage in any business for compensation or profit... [and]
that such disability... shall, with reasonable probability, continue for some indefinite period
of time without any present indication of recovery therefrom").
269. See Miller, supra note 27, at 710 (illustrating fact that because ADA only protects
individuals with disabilities when disability substantially limits major life activity, possibility
of false claims is lessened).
270. See Giliberti, supra note 3, at 603 (stating that standard disability plan pays physical
disability benefits until recipient reaches sixty-five or is no longer disabled); Schlitz, supra note
4, at 599 (identifying 65 as common age at which disability benefits stop).
271. See Walter Y. Oi, Employment and Benefitsfor People with Diverse Disabilities, in
DISABILITY,WORKAND CASHBENEFITs 103,120 (JerryL. Mashaw etal. eds., 1996) (discussing
1992 study that found that 126,470 disability insurance recipients began receiving benefits at
or above age 50 and only 66,304 recipients began receiving before turning 50).
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text of disability benefits." Congress specifically addressed the issue of
parity in health insurance benefits in 1996 by passing the Mental Health Parity
Act (MHPA)273 as an amendment to the Health Insurance Portability Act. 4
The MHPA, however, does not address the issue of parity in disability bene-
fits."75 Disability benefits differ significantly from health benefits and, there-
fore, require different treatment under the ADA.276 Health benefits merely
supplement an individual's salary, while disability benefits actually replace
an individual's salary. 7 Therefore, a disability plan that provides less gener-
ous benefits to an individual disabled by a mental, rather than a physical con-
dition, actually pays the equally entitled individual with a mental disability
less than it does an individual with a physical disability.
With regard to health insurance, providers predetermine what or how
many treatments the plan will cover depending on the nature of treatment and
the underlying condition. By definition, therefore, health benefits vary
depending on the type of illness or disability. In contrast, disability benefit
payments reflect a percentage of the recipient's pre-disability salary.279 The
272. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1017-18 (6th Cir. 1997) (en
bane) (finding no parity requirement for disability benefits in ADA based on Congress's passage
of Mental Health Parity Act, which addresses health benefits, and EEOC's statement in
enforcement guidelines that health insurance plan may limit treatment for mental health
conditions without imposing similar limit upon treatment of physical conditions); Parker v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 99 F.3d 181, 187 (6th Cir. 1996) (determining plaintiffs standing
in disability benefit by reference to Gonzales, health insurance benefit case); EEOC v. CNA Ins.
Cos., 96 F.3d 1039,1044 (7th Cir. 1996) (same).
273. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (Supp. 1996).
274. See id. (forbidding lifetime and annual limitations on mental health benefits if plan
does not impose like limitations upon physical health benefits).
275. See id. § 300gg-91(cX1XA) (stating that MHPA is inapplicable to disability benefit
plans).
276. See Giliberti, supra note 3, at 603 (arguing that dissimilarity of health and disability
benefits make EEOC enforcement guidelines for health insurance inapplicable to disability
benefits).
277. See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTrrUTE, supra note 1, at 289 (contrasting
purposes of health insurance with disability income insurance).
278. See S. REP.No. 101-116, at25 (1989),reprintedinLEISLATIVEHISTORYsupra note
23, at 63 (outlawing discrimination against individuals with disabilities in "rates of pay or any
other form of compensation"). Presuming that disability benefits equal a form of salary, then
an employer who provides such benefits in a discriminatory manner violates not merely the
proscription on discrimination in fringe benefits, but also the proscription on discrimination in
pay. Such a reading of the ADA severely undermines the ADA's effectiveness in remedying
the fact that individuals with disabilities have lacked a "meaningful opportunity to participate
in the economic and social mainstream." 135 CONG. REC. S10,711 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989)
(statement of Sen. Harkin), reprinted in LEGISLATVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 115.
279. See Giliberti, supra note 3, at 603-04 (explaining that recipient's monthly disability
benefits reflects percentage of recipient's pre-disability salary, making "variations in symptoms
or treatment regimens" irrelevant consideration in determining cost to provider).
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mental or physical nature of the disability does not affect the amount of the
monthly benefit, and it should be irrelevant to the cost of providing such
disability benefitss28
2. The Correct Interpretation Tools: The ADEA and Title VUI
Courts refusing to order parity in mental and physical benefit levels also
rely on Rehabilitation Act precedent l despite significant differences between
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. For example, although Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act is a precursor to the ADA, it lacks any explicit discus-
sion of insurance benefits or the Rehabilitation Act's application to insur-
ance.282 Also, despite the fact that Section 504 protected individuals suffering
from mental disabilities, the provision and the precedent interpreting that
provision reflect traditional prejudices against people with mental disabili-
ties.283 Furthermore, the Rehabilitation Act cases that uphold differentiation
among individuals with disabilities also have emphasized the fact that such
discrimination does not harm individuals with disabilities as a class."
In contrast, Congress clearly has placed emphasis on protecting the
individual from discrimination in enacting modem civil rights laws such as the
ADA, Title VII, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act."s In
O'Connor, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that civil rights statutes like
the ADEA seek to protect the individual who is within the protected class, not
280. See id. at 604 (explaining that variations in disability and treatment do not change
recipient's monthly pay, therefore, underlying cause of disability should be irrelevant in limiting
benefits).
281. See Lewis v. KMart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 171 (4th Cir. 1999) (relying on Traynor v.
Turnage in rejecting plaintiff's parity claim); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608
(3d Cir. 1998) (relying on Alexander, Traynor, and Colautt), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 850
(1999); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1016 (6th Cir. 1997) (en bane)
(relying on Alexander v. Choate and Traynor v. Turnage); EEOC v.CNA Ins., Cos., 96 F.3d
1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1996) (relying onAlexander).
282. See Giliberti, supra note 3, at 602 (distinguishing Rehabilitation Act cases that
address mental and physical disparity from ADA cases on grounds that Rehabilitation Act
contains no explicit language on insurance).
283. See Miller, supra note 27, at 701-02 (identifying fact that ADA possesses far broader
authority than Rehabilitation Act and concluding that hostility and misunderstanding toward
mental disabilities contained in Rehabilitation Act precedent makes it inapplicable ADA cases
involving mental disability claims).
284. See Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 549 (1987) ("There is nothing in the Rehabili-
tation Act that requires that any benefit extended to one category of handicapped persons be
extended to all other categories of handicapped persons."); Moddemo v. King, 82 F.3d 1059,
1062 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that placing cap only on mental health coverage actually benefits
"disabled as a class - mentally and physically disabled individuals in the aggregate").
285. See infra notes 286-90 and accompanying text (discussing importance of individual
in ADEA and Title VII case law).
1388
PARITY INLONG-TERM DISABILITY BENEFITS
to protect the class of individuals who comprise the protected group." 6
Therefore, an employer who favors one person in the protected class over
another, but still makes the final decision based on consideration of the
protected characteristic, violates the ADEA.' This emphasis on the individ-
ual nature of civil rights laws also is evident in the Supreme Court's Title VII
precedent.s The Supreme Court has ruled that in defending a Title VII
action, an employer's beneficence to a disadvantaged class as a whole does
not excuse its discrimination against an individual member of that class. 9 As
discussed above, Congress explicitly incorporated Title VII's enforcement
procedures and remedies into the ADA in an attempt to protect individuals
with disabilities as it has protected other historically disadvantaged minori-
ties.29 By analogy, an employer who prefers an individual with a physical
disability to an individual with a mental disability is still discriminating on the
basis of the disability and thereby violating the ADA.
V Conclusion
Current case law on the issue of parity in disability benefits is wrong.
Title I of the ADA does in fact require employers to provide the same level of
long-term disability benefits for mental and physical disabilities. Federal
courts rejecting this position argue that the ADA only prohibits discrimination
between individuals with disabilities and those without disabilities.29 Con-
gress, however, did not temper the ADA's protections in this manner.
Congress designed the ADA to afford individuals with disabilities the
same protection available to other historically disadvantaged individuals.'
In deciding cases under similar civil rights statutes such as Title VII and the
ADEA, the Supreme Court has emphasized the individual nature of civil rights
286. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312-13 (1997)
(stating that "ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis of age and not class membership" and
explaining that ADEA "does not ban discrimination against employees because they are aged
40 or older, it bans discrimination against employees because of their age, but limits the
protected class to those who are 40 or older").
287. See id. at 312 ("The fact that one person in the protected class has lost out to another
person in the protected class is thus irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of his age.").
288. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453 (1981) (stating that "principal focus" of
Title VII is on protecting individual employee, not minority group as whole).
289. See id. at 455 ("It is clear that Congress never intended to give an employer license
to discriminate against some employees on the basis of race or sex merely because he favorably
treats other members of the employees' group.").
290. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing ADA's incorporation of Title
VII's enforcement procedures and remedies).
291. See supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing reasoning of courts that rejected plaintiffs' claims
for parity in disability benefits).
292. See supra Part II (discussing history, purpose, and scope of Title I of ADA).
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protections - that beneficence to a class of individuals does not excuse dis-
crimination against the members of that class.293 "It is clear that Congress
never intended to give an employer license to discriminate against some em-
ployees.. merely because he favorably treats other members of the employ-
ees' group. 294
Likewise, the ADA does not permit an employer to treat equally disabled
individuals inequitably based on the nature of their disabilities. Arbitrary,
disability-based distinctions among individuals with disabilities are as invidi-
ous and discriminatory as those made between individuals with disabilities
and those without disabilities. The language and spirit of the ADA prohibit
employers from subjecting individuals with mental disabilities to less compre-
hensive benefit coverage. However, the ADA's protections will remain a
mere promise to individuals with mental disabilities until the courts release
the ADA from the constraints of the Rehabilitation Act.
293. See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing Supreme Court cases involving Title VII and
ADEA).
294. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,455 (1981).
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